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This paper provides an overview of public expenditures on education and 
healthcare in Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and some 
other countries of the former Soviet Union before and during the global financial 
crisis. Before the crisis, the governments of these countries were substantially 
increasing spending on education and health. The crisis adversely affected the 
FSU countries and worsened their fiscal situation. The analysis indicates that dur-
ing the crisis, despite the fiscal constraints, public education and health expendi-
tures have mostly been maintained or increased in almost all of these countries. 
However, the crisis situation was not taken as an opportunity to address these 
countries’ key education and healthcare problems related to demographic changes, 
insufficient per capita expenditure levels, the low efficiency of public spending 
and the insufficient quality of services. These issues form an ambitious reform 
agenda for these countries in the medium- and long-term. 
 Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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1. Introduction 
This paper has been prepared in the framework of the project “The Impact of 
the Global Financial Crisis on Public Service Delivery in the Economies of the 
Former Soviet Union,” which is supported by the Local Government and Public 
Service Reform Initiative of the Open Society Institute. This project aims to ana-
lyze the attitude of the governments in the countries the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) towards financing key public services in education and health under the 
conditions of the global economic crisis. The project covers six FSU countries: 
Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. For each of these 
countries, a separate report has been prepared by the project team. In addition to 
the six country reports, this paper provides a regional overview of common trends 
and country-specific factors influencing the general economic and fiscal situation 
and the performance of the education and health sectors in these countries. Where 
relevant and possible (from the point of view of data availability), this overview 
also covers some other FSU countries. 
The financial crisis strongly affected the FSU region in 2008-2009, during 
which it experienced either a recession or a considerable slowdown in growth. The 
crisis also adversely affected government budget revenues, so governments had to 
adjust their expenditures to falling revenues. Under such conditions, public ex-
penditures on education and health could have suffered unavoidable cuts. Whether 
or not this actually happened is the central question this project aims to answer. 
All seven papers prepared under this project have a similar structure and are 
based on the same methodological approach. This approach implies a comparison 
of absolute and relative indicators of public education and health financing in the 
countries before and during the global economic crisis. For the purposes of this 
study, 2008 is considered the last pre-crisis year, and 2009 is the year when the 
crisis was felt in all countries of the region (see more on the definition of pre-crisis 
and crisis periods in Chapter 2). The changes in the political, economic and social 
environment affecting public finance in the country, even if unrelated to the crisis, 
have also been taken into account in order to identify the net impact of the crisis. 
The issues of the quality of education and health services and service delivery 
efficiency are also addressed in the paper. 
In order to avoid incomparability of data, we use statistical information provid-
ed by international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, UN Population THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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Division, WHO, UNESCO etc. In some cases, when data from these sources were 
incomplete or inconsistent, data from national statistical offices or country-specific 
publications such as the IMF country reports were also used. All data presented in 
the report are up-to-date as of mid-April 2011.  
The authors would like to express their gratitude to Haik Zakrzewski, who pro-
vided administrative and logistical support in the implementation of this project at 
CASE, and Paulina Szyrmer, who copy-edited the final version of this study.  
The paper has the following structure: Section 2 discusses the general econom-
ic and fiscal situation in the analyzed countries in the pre-crisis period and during 
the crisis. Section 3 provides an analysis of education system financing before and 
during the crisis and Section 4 looks at the developments in health financing. Sec-
tion 5 summarizes key findings of the paper and discusses the policy implications 
of the analysis. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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2. Fiscal Situation 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a comparative perspective of the 
macro-fiscal situations in the six FSU countries studied: Belarus, Georgia, Kyr-
gyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, in order to determine the fiscal space for 
government spending on education and healthcare. Additionally, we consider 
some institutional, demographic, structural and other important characteristics of 
the analyzed region, which may influence the main subject of our analysis. 
 
 
2.1.  Basic characteristics of the region 
 
The analyzed countries represent both common and specific characteristics 
which are, on the one hand, a result of their common Soviet heritage, and, on the 
other, a matter of cultural, religious, geographical and other differences. In this 
section, income, demographic, institutional and some other characteristics of the 
analyzed countries are used as benchmarks for further analysis. 
 
2.1.1.  Institutional characteristics and the transition progress 
 
All analyzed countries are former Soviet republics, i.e. their “market memory” 
is more or less the same: all of them except Moldova spent more than 70 years 
under a central planning system
1. All of them gained/ regained independence in 
1991–1992; however, Russia as the successor and dominant republic of the former 
USSR, can be treated as being independent in the Soviet period. 
The deficit of “market memory” and the relatively fresh independence experi-
ence has influenced the speed of transition in all of these countries, especially in 
the 1990s. As of the end of 2010, the transition progress in most of these countries 
looked quite similar: the average in terms of EBRD transition indicators was 
around 3 for all countries except Belarus (its average ratio was less than 2+). 
However, the recent record of structural reforms in the region was quite limited: 
                                                 
1 Moldova spent 51 years; based on De Melo et al. (1997). THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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according to the EBRD, Belarus was the only country that continued reforms in 
2000s. Its rating increased in 2007-2010, while the scores of other countries re-
mained unchanged (Kyrgyzstan – since 2004, Russia – since 2006, Georgia and 
Moldova – since 2007, Ukraine – since 2008) (see Figure 2.1a). 
Among the analyzed countries, Russia implemented the most comprehensive 
reforms: its EBRD scores for 9 transition indicators vary from 2+ to 4, and the 
standard deviation for these indicators in 2010 was about 0.63. Ukraine has similar 
characteristics, while other countries have some values with a score of 2 or even 2-
. Overall, all countries except Belarus succeeded in privatization (both large- and 
small-scale), price and foreign trade/exchange liberalization, while other compo-
nents of their economic systems require further reforms (see Figure 2.1b). 
 
Figure 2.1. Economic Transition Progress 









































































* Simple average of 9 EBRD transition indicators (ranging from 1 – analogue of planned 
economy – to 4+ (4.33) – “standards and performance typical of advanced industrial econ-
omies”). 
** LSP – large scale privatization; SSP – small scale privatization; ER – enterprise restruc-
turing; PL – price liberalization; TFES – trade & forex system; CP – competition policy; 
BRIRL – banking reform & interest rate liberalization; SMNB – securities markets & non-
bank financial institutions; OIR – overall infrastructure reform. 
Source: own estimates based on the data from the EBRD Transition Indicators Database. 
 
Another measure of economic transition – change of economic structure – shows 
more similarities than differences among countries. For example, the share of the 
services sector compared to the last year of the Soviet period increased everywhere. 
However, deindustrialization did not happen in the case of Belarus, and the share of 
the agricultural sector in Kyrgyzstan was reduced only slightly (see Figure 2.2). Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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These differences reflect some country-specific features, such as minimal progress 
in large-scale privatization in Belarus (which inherited many large industrial enter-
prises from the Soviet era which remain in government hands and continue ineffec-
tive production processes) and large labor migration and inflows of remittances in 
Moldova and Kyrgyzstan (which are spent largely on domestic services). 
 
Figure 2.2. GDP structure: Value added in major sectors of the economy 
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Source: WDI-GDF database. 
 
Table 2.1. Ease of doing business rankings 
 Belarus  Georgia Kyrgyz-
stan  Moldova Russia Ukraine 
Old classification 
2005 (DB 2007) – 175*  124  112  104  88  97  132 
2006 (DB 2007) – 175  129  37  90  103  96  128 
2007 (DB 2009) – 181  115  21  99  92  106  144 
2008 (DB 2010) – 183  82  16  80  108  112  146 
2009 (DB 2010) – 183  58  11  41  94  120  142 
change, 2005-09  66  101  63  -6  -23  -10 
change, 2008-09  24  5  39  14  -8  4 
New classification 
2009 (DB 2011)  64  13  47  87  116  147 
2010 (DB 2011) – 183  68  12  44  90  123  145 
change, 2009-10  -4  1  3  -3  -7  2 
* Total number of countries. 
Source: Doing Business database and reports. 
 
Structural changes in the region did not necessarily coincide with an improve-
ment in the business climate. The yearly “Doing Business” report, a joint ranking THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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produced by the World Bank and IFC, allows for a comparison of the business cli-
mate in the analyzed countries from the point of view of formal procedures and reg-
ulations. Georgia is the only country ranked among the top-20 countries of the 
world; additionally, it is one of the fastest reformers in the region (see Table 2.1) and 
in the world as a whole. Other fast reformers, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, are not yet 
among the global leaders, while doing business in the remaining three countries, 
Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, became more difficult during the analyzed period. 
 
2.1.2.  Income and poverty 
 
In terms of per capita income, the region includes countries in low, lower-
middle and upper-middle income groups (according to World Bank Atlas Meth-
od). In 2009, the gap between the poorest (Kyrgyzstan) and richest (Russia) econ-
omies exceeded 90% (i.e. Kyrgyz per capita GNI amounted to 10% of that in Rus-
sia). PPP-based poverty headcount ratios (USD 2 a day) also differ among the 
countries of the region: according to this indicator, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine 
are free or almost free of extreme poverty, while others have significant (up to 1/3 
of population) shares of poor people defined according to this poverty line. The 
reasons behind higher or lower poverty rates are also different: the low poverty 
rate in Russia is caused by a relatively high average income, while in Belarus and 
Ukraine, income redistribution plays an important role. High poverty rates in Kyr-
gyzstan originated mainly from its low average income, while those in Georgia 
and Moldova can largely be explained by high levels of inequality (the abovemen-
tioned indicators are summarized in Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2. Selected income, poverty and inequality indicators 
  Belarus Georgia Kyrgyz-
stan  Moldova Russia Ukraine 












GDP per capita, current 
international USD
  12741  4765 2269 2853  14927  6347 
Poverty headcount ratio 
at USD 2 a day (PPP)  
(% of population)
2 
0.0  32.6 29.4 12.5  0.1  0.5 
Income share held by 
lowest 20%
3  9.2 5.3 8.8 6.8 6.0 9.4 
Gini index
3  27.2 41.3 33.4 38.0 42.3 27.5 
1 Data for 2009; 
2 data for 2008 except Kyrgyzstan (2007) and Ukraine (2005);
 3 data for 
2008 except Kyrgyzstan (2007). 
Source: WDI-GDF database WEO database (April 2011). Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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2.1.3.  Demographic background 
 
Five countries in the region (except Kyrgyzstan
2) represent similar demographic 
trends: a declining population, a rapid rate of aging, and low fertility rates. However, 
if one splits the transition period into two decades, more differences appear. First, 
the population of Georgia has started to recover: at the end of the last decade, it had 
almost the same population as at the beginning of the decade. In Russia and Moldo-
va, population decline appears to be stopping and has even turned into a slow 
growth in Russia. Meanwhile, the populations of Belarus and Ukraine continue to 
shrink. Moreover, the average annual rates of its decline have increased compared to 
the previous decade (see Figure 2.3b). Only Kyrgyzstan has continued to grow, with 
approximately the same rate as in the first transition decade. 
 
Figure 2.3. Population dynamics in the region in the last two decades 


















































































































Note: data is presented as of the beginning of period. 
* In 2009, Belarus conducted a population census, but the data for 2001 – 2008 has not 
been revised yet. 
Sources: (a) World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database; (b) 
IMF WEO Database, October 2010 (data for the beginning of 2010 was taken from nation-
al statistical offices). 
 
Decreased fertility seems to be one of the main reasons for population decline: 
it fell from about 2.1 at the end of the 1980s/beginning of the 1990s to about 1.3 – 
                                                 
2 The dominant religion may be one of the possible explanations of this phenomenon: 
Kyrgyzstan is the only country from the analyzed region where Islam is the religion of the 
vast majority of the population. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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1.6 in 2005–2010. Kyrgyzstan also faced a decrease in fertility, but it remained 
higher than is required for simple reproduction (about 2.6 in 2005–2010). As a 
result, the share of children in all countries fell dramatically (see Table 2.3). The 
“Baby-boomers” of the late 1980s/early 1990s are now in the 15–24 age cohort, 
creating additional demand for post-secondary and tertiary education. At the same 
time, the share of the elderly population increased (except in Kyrgyzstan), but 
quite moderately. According to UN forecasts, in the next two decades all of these 
countries will face a significant increase of the share of the elderly, together with a 
slow replacement of the working-age group, which will increase economic pres-
sure on the working-age group. Additionally, it is expected that the share of chil-
dren will remain more or less stable (again, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan), 
while the share of cohorts in education age will decrease significantly. 
 
Table 2.3. Selected age groups, % of population 
  Age 0-14  Age 15-24, share  Age 65+, share 
1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 
Belarus  23.1 14.7 13.5 13.8 14.7 10.9 10.6 13.4 19.5 
Georgia  24.6 16.7 15.9 15.0 16.2 12.1  9.3  14.3 20.8 
Kyrgyzstan  37.6 29.1 22.5 18.1 20.8 17.0  5.0  5.0  9.1 
Moldova  27.9 16.6 16.3 14.5 18.0 12.4  8.3  11.1 17.9 
Russia  23.0 15.0 15.2 13.3 14.4 11.9 10.1 12.9 19.4 
Ukraine  21.5 13.9 15.2 13.6 14.0 11.4 12.1 15.6 20.1 
Source: own estimates based on the data from World Population Prospects: The 2008 Re-
vised Population Database. 
 
Migration (permanent and temporary) creates additional pressures on the work-
ing-age population in four countries of the region: Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and 
Kyrgyzstan (see Table 2.4). Although good comparable data on temporary labor 
migration is not available, some indirect evidence can be obtained from remittanc-
es data. According to balance-of-payments data from 2008, migrants’ transfers 
amounted to 31.3% of GDP in Moldova and 24% in Kyrgyzstan, while the Inter-
national Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) estimated them at 31.4% of 
GDP in both countries in 2006. Other economies of the region also benefit from 
remittances (see Table 2.4). 
In terms of urbanization, the region also demonstrates some diversity. Belarus 
and Russia are highly urbanized countries and the share of their rural populations 
is only about 26%, followed by Ukraine (about 30%), Georgia and Moldova 
(about 50%) and the more rural Kyrgyzstan (65%). According to the data of UN Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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Population Division
3, during the last decade, the rural population shrank fastest in 
Belarus, followed by Moldova and Ukraine, while Kyrgyzstan and Russia kept 
their shares almost unchanged. However, according to its forecast, during the next 
decade, urbanization will speed up in all countries of the region, with Moldova as 
the leader. Overall, the UN Population Division expects that the share of rural 
populations in the region will fall by 3.2 percentage points (simple average) during 
the decade of 2010–2020. 
 
Table 2.4. Selected migration and remittances indicators 
  Migration stock  
as a % of population in 2010
4 
Inward remittances flow,  
% of GDP 
Emigrants Immigrants Difference 2008*  2006** 
Belarus 18.6  11.4  7.2  0.7  6.3 
Georgia 25.1  4.0 21.1  5.7  20.2 
Kyrgyzstan 11.2  4.0  7.2  24.0  31.4 
Moldova 21.5  11.4  10.1  31.3  31.4 
Russia 7.9  8.7  -0.8 0.4  1.4 
Ukraine 14.4 11.6  2.8  3.2  8.0 
* Based on the Balance of Payments methodology; Data on the compensation of employ-
ees for Kyrgyzstan and on workers’ remittances for Belarus is not available. The total 
inward flow of remittances in Kyrgyzstan is estimated at 28.6% of GDP (see Mogilevsky 
(2011) for details). 
** Total inward remittances, IFAD estimates. 




2.2.  Pre-crisis fiscal developments 
 
2.2.1.  Defining the beginning of the crisis 
 
The quarterly dynamics of GDP growth (Figure 2.4) indicate that the crisis 
started in the fourth quarter of 2008 or the first quarter of 2009 in all countries of 
the region. Georgia’s economy started to contract in the third quarter of 2008 as a 
result of the Russia-Georgia armed conflict in August of 2008. Belarusian official 
statistics recorded a GDP decline only in the second quarter of 2009. But first 
quarter growth (1.1% yoy) was largely due to increased inventories and thus the 
                                                 
3 World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision. 
4 The World Bank has been estimating migrants stock since 1970. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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first quarter can still be considered the first quarter of the recession. The recession 
continued until the end of 2009 (Belarus showed a small growth in the fourth quar-
ter of 2009; Kyrgyzstan started to grow in the third quarter of 2009
5). 
Pre-crisis growth in the analyzed countries lasted from 9 to 14 years, depending 
on the time of exit from post-communist adaptation output decline. Georgia, Bela-
rus, and Kyrgyzstan started to grow in the middle of the 1990s. They continued 
growing during the financial crisis of the late 1990s but this did not mean they 
were not affected by that crisis. Steady recovery in Russia, Moldova and Ukraine 
started around 2000. In order to have a common period of analysis for the study, 
the years of 2000–2008 are considered the pre-crisis period, 2009 is considered the 
crisis year, and 2010 is the year when recovery began. 
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Sources: IFS Database, national statistical offices. 
 
2.2.2.  General economic environment 
 
On average, during the pre-crisis period (between 2000 and 2008), the real GDP 
growth rate in the region amounted to 7% per annum – 3 percentage points more 
than the world average. In the pre-crisis 2008, most countries of the region grew 
faster than the world economy or economies of the CEE (see Table 2.5), with the 
exception of Georgia (for the reasons described above) and Ukraine, where a high 
reliance on private external borrowing caused an earlier beginning of the recession. 
                                                 
5 The later recession in Kyrgyzstan (second half of 2010) was caused by the political ten-
sions of April and June of 2010, see Mogilevsky (2011) for details. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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Table 2.5. Real GDP growth rates, % yoy 
 2007  2008  2009 2010 
World 5.4  2.9  -0.5 5.0 
Major advanced economies (G7)  2.2  -0.2  -3.7 2.8 
Euro area  2.9  0.4  -4.1 1.7 
Central and Eastern Europe  5.5  3.2  -3.6 4.2 
FSU 9.0  5.3  -6.4 4.6 
Belarus 8.6  10.2  0.2 7.6 
Georgia 12.3  2.4  -3.8 6.4 
Kyrgyz Republic  8.5  7.6  2.9 -1.4 
Moldova 3.0  7.8  -6.0 6.9 
Russia 8.5  5.2  -7.8 4.0 
Ukraine 7.9  1.9  -14.8 4.2 
Source: WEO database (April 2011). 
 
Rapid economic growth in all countries
6 was driven by consumption and ex-
ports (see Figure 2.5), although the contribution of investment in some cases (Bel-
arus) was also substantial. In its turn, consumption was fueled mainly by an in-
crease in wages/social transfers (like in Belarus, Georgia, Russia or Ukraine) 
and/or a significant inflow of migrant remittances (Moldova and Kyrgyzstan). Fast 
growth in Russia supported the exports of other countries in the region (except 
Georgia, which largely benefited from growth in other oil-exporting countries). 
 
Figure 2.5. Contributions to GDP growth in 2000–2008 (percentage points from annual 
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Source: own estimates based on the data from WDI-GDF database. 
                                                 
6 There is no data on aggregate demand real growth rates available for Georgia, either from 
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Among country-specific factors, one can point to the improvements in business 
environment and governance acheived by President Saakashvili’s administration 
in Georgia. These reforms ensured FDI inflow, the development of domestic busi-
ness, and increased tax collection, which allowed the government to increase so-
cial transfers
7. For a long time, Belarus benefited from a Customs Union with Rus-
sia and lower prices on imported Russian oil and gas. This allowed the authorities 
to boost investment (mainly construction) and increase the population’s incomes. 
Kyrgyzstan reaped the fruits of re-exporting Chinese goods to Russia and other 
countries of the region and from a significant inflow of labor migrant remittances 
(as did Moldova). In Ukraine, the political cycle influenced economic performance 
significantly, as on the eve of several big political events (presidential, parliamen-
tary and local elections), the authorities pushed wages and social transfers up 
(since 2004, wages had been growing faster than labor productivity). Also, in the 
first years after the Orange Revolution, Ukraine faced increased FDI inflow, but 
later populist policies worsened the business climate in the country. Finally, Rus-
sian growth was led mainly by increasing exports of natural resources and a redis-
tribution of part of the oil revenues. 
 
2.2.3.  Pre-crisis fiscal performance 
 
In the period of rapid pre-crisis growth, general government (GG) revenues 
grew even faster than GDP: between 2005 and 2008, Georgia led with a 58.2% 
revenues increase in real terms
8 (real GDP went up by 25.9%), while Moldova and 
Ukraine experienced “slow” growth of about 22–25% (accompanied by a GDP 
growth of 16–18%). Russia was the only country in which, according to WEO 
data, the tax burden fell, as real GDP grew faster than real GG revenues. In the 
other countries, the tax burden (measured as the share of GG revenues in GDP) 
increased for this period by 3.8% of GDP (simple average). Government size be-
fore the crisis varied from a relatively low 30% of GDP in Georgia and Kyrgyz-
stan, through a moderate 40–44% in Moldova, Russia and Ukraine to a high 50% 
in Belarus (see Table 2.6). 
However, the reasons for this rapid revenue increase differed significantly 
across the countries. Belarus benefited from windfall profits from refining Russian 
oil (as it was exempted from Russia’s export duty) and from an increase in its own 
                                                 
7 However, social spending in Georgia remained low, as the significant increase started 
from a very low base. 
8 Hereinafter: deflated by GDP deflator. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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export duties. Georgia implemented a successful tax reform
9 and from the in-
creased inflow of grants from international organizations and foreign govern-
ments. Moldova and Ukraine faced increased indirect tax revenues thanks to the 
rapid growth of consumption accompanied by better collection of these taxes. In 
Kyrgyzstan, one of the major reasons for revenue increase was the increase in tax 
collections due to the very rapid growth of taxes on imports (financed by remit-
tances and other inflows) and some improvement in collection of direct taxes 
(grants from international organizations were another growing revenue source). 
Finally, according to the GFS data, Russian general government revenues grew 
thanks to “miscellaneous and unidentified revenue
10” and “voluntary transfers 
other than grants”
11, while revenues from energy exports and other main sources 
grew at more or less the same rate as GDP. 
 
Table 2.6. Size of the general government (% of GDP) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Belarus 
Revenues  47.4 49.1 49.5 50.6 45.7 
Expenditures  47.2 47.4 47.2 47.2 46.1 
Balance  0.2 1.7 2.3 3.4  -0.4 
Georgia 
Revenues  24.4 26.7 29.3 30.7 29.3 
Expenditures  22.2 23.3 28.4 32.7 35.8 
Balance 2.2  3.4  0.8  -2.0  -6.5 
Kyrgyz-
stan 
Revenues  24.7 26.4 30.3 29.9 32.3 
Expenditures  28.5 29.1 31.0 28.9 33.4 
Balance -3.8  -2.7  -0.6  1.0  -1.1 
Moldova 
Revenues  38.6 39.9 41.7 40.6 38.9 
Expenditures  37.0 39.8 42.0 41.6 45.2 
Balance 1.5  0.0  -0.2  -1.0  -6.3 
                                                 
9 Tax reform was implemented in 2005: total number of taxes was reduced from 22 to 6, 
their rates were also changed. Tax code change was supported by governance reform that 
allowed increasing transparency and decreasing corruption, creating additional incentives 
to reduction of informal activity (see Labadze et al. (2011) for details). According to the 
estimates of Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro (2010), in 2007 (1.5 years after tax reform) 
the level of informality, although fell by 3% of GDP (see Table 2.7), remained one of the 
highest in the world. 
10 GFS manual defines this line as ‘items that might appear here are sales of used military 
and other goods that were not classified as assets, sales of scrap, non-life insurance claims 
against insurance corporations, non-life insurance premiums of government-operated in-
surance schemes, payments received for damage to government property other than pay-
ments from a judicial process, and any revenues for which adequate information is not 
available to permit their classification elsewhere’. 
11 According to the GFS manual, ‘this category includes gifts and voluntary donations 
from individuals, private nonprofit institutions, nongovernmental foundations, corpora-
tions, and any other source other than governments and international organizations’. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Russia 
Revenues  41.0 39.5 39.9 39.2 35.1 
Expenditures  32.8 31.1 33.1 34.3 41.4 
Balance  8.2 8.3 6.8 4.9  -6.3 
Ukraine 
Revenues  41.8 43.2 41.8 44.3 42.2 
Expenditures  44.1 44.6 43.8 47.4 48.5 
Balance  -2.3 -1.4 -2.0 -3.2 -6.2 
Source: WEO (April 2011) database. 
 
Increases in revenues accompanied by fast GDP growth and the appreciation of 
local currencies against the USD allowed for a significant reduction of gross GG 
debt in all countries but Ukraine
12: between 2005 and 2008, GG fell by 6.5% of 
GDP in Georgia and Russia, by 10% of GDP in Belarus, 16% of GDP in Moldova 
and by 37.5% of GDP in Kyrgyzstan (Ukrainian debt went up by 3% of GDP)
13. 
Evidently, the fast growth of revenues allowed for increasing expenditures; 
however, expenditure growth was slower than revenues growth in Belarus and 
Kyrgyzstan; in other countries expenditures grew faster than revenues. As a result, 
before the crisis, these two countries faced a fiscal surplus, while the others accu-
mulated moderate deficits (except Russia, but its surplus was reduced by half for 
that period). 
The increase in expenditures was accompanied by changes in their structure, 
which was also country-specific. Belarus and Ukraine mostly increased expendi-
tures on economic affairs. Belarus decreased (in relation to GDP) the outlays for 
general public services, education and social protection
14. Russia drastically ex-
panded spending on general public services, while Georgia significantly increased 
financing on defense and public order and safety
15. In Moldova, the highest ex-
penditure increases concerned health, social protection and education. As a result, 
before the crisis one could see three types of GG expenditures structures (see Fig-
ure 2.6b): (1) in Belarus, economic affairs, housing and utilities dominated, and 
social protection was more important than other three aggregated expenditure 
lines; (2) in Georgia and Russia, the biggest share belonged to the general public 
                                                 
12 In smaller countries the debt grew slower because their borrowing opportunities were 
reduced due to already high indebtedness (the case of Kyrgyzstan, where IFIs for some 
time switched from loans to grants) or political reasons (for a long period of time the 
communist government in Moldova could not negotiate appropriate conditions with IFIs). 
13 According to the data from WEO database (April 2011). 
14 Social protection includes pension expenditures, unless otherwise indicated. 
15 The classification is as follows: general public services, defense, public order and safety, 
economic affairs, environmental protection, housing and community amenities, health, 
recreation, culture and religion, education, social protection. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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services, defense, public order and safety, environmental protection. The govern-
ment spent relatively little on education and health, and approximately equal ex-
penditures were allocated to social protection and economic affairs; (3) in Moldo-
va and Ukraine, social protection expenditures were the most important, while 
others were relatively equal (however, social protection outlays in Ukraine in 2008 
amounted to a record 20.6% of GDP, while in other countries of the region, they 
did not exceed 12.5% of GDP). 
 
Figure 2.6. Structure of general government expenditures
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Source: own estimates based on the data from GFS database, except Kyrgyzstan – own 
estimates based on the data from the Ministry of Finance of Kyrgyzstan. 
                                                 
16 Data of functional classification of expenditures for Kyrgyzstan is not available from 
international databases. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 100  27 
Public finance management is heavily centralized in the analyzed countries: on-
ly in Belarus and Ukraine is the share of local governments in GG revenues 
around 35%, while in other countries it fluctuates around 20-25% (see Figure 
2.7a). Taking into account the revenues of local governments without transfers 
from the central budget, their shares in total GG revenues are even lower: around 
6% in Georgia, 11% in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Russia, 18% in Ukraine and 
25% in Belarus. Georgia radically increased centralization in 2008: the share of 
central government grants in local government revenues increased from about 20 
to more than 70% (Figure 2.7b), i.e. the majority of taxes were collected at the 
central government level. 
 
Figure 2.7. Selected indicators of local government finance 
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* LG – local governments. 
Source: own estimates based on the data from GFS database and IMF country reports for 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Despite the small role of local budgets in revenue collection, the financing of 
education and healthcare in some countries mostly comes from this source. This 
practice was widespread in the beginning of the 2000s, but currently, three coun-
tries of the region (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova), finance healthcare mainly 
from the central budget. Education in all countries but Georgia is still financed 
mostly at the local level (see Figure 2.8). 
 Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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Figure 2.8. Share of local government expenditures on education and health in total GG 






















* for Kyrgyzstan, only 2006 data is available. 
Source: own estimates based on the data from GFS database and Ministry of Finance of 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Before the crisis, most countries of the region had relatively balanced or sur-
plus budgets (only Ukraine runs a permanent deficit, see Table 2.6). Two countries 
of the region, Russia and Belarus, saved a large portion of their surpluses in stabi-
lization funds
17 that accumulated windfall profits from exports of energy and other 
commodities. Resources from these funds were supposed to be used for smoothing 
out expenditures in the case of a worse external environment and a reduction of 
windfall revenues. 
 
2.2.4.  Pre-crisis imbalances and vulnerabilities 
 
Incomplete reforms and a weak business environment in the region correlate 
with low degrees of democratization. According to Freedom House’s “Freedom in 
the World”, political regimes in the region are either “not free” (Belarus, Russia) 
or “partly free” (the rest) with a tendency towards improvement (Moldova, Kyr-
gyzstan, Georgia) or worsening (Ukraine). On top of this, Transparency Interna-
tional considers all countries of the region but Georgia highly corrupt (Transpar-
ency International (2010)). All of these distortions result in a high share of infor-
mality: according to the estimates of Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro (2010), in 
2007, the shadow economy amounted to, on average, 40–60% of GDP in these 
                                                 
17 See Sinitsina (2011), Shymanovich and Kruk (2011). THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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countries (see Table 2.7)
18. However, the high share of informal economy (partial-
ly accounted for in the GDP) means that economic growth/decline may not be 
mechanically replicated by the dynamics of government revenues. 
 
Table 2.7. The share of the shadow economy (% of GDP) 




Belarus  48.3 48.1 47.9 47.6 47.0 46.1 45.2 44.2 43.3  46.4  133 
Georgia 68.3 67.3 67.2 67.2 65.9 65.5 65.1 63.6 62.1  65.8  150 
Kyrgyz-
stan  41.4 41.2 40.8 41.4 40.5 39.8 40.1 39.8 38.8  40.4  108 
Moldova  45.6 45.1 44.1 44.5 44.6 44.0 43.4 44.3  --  44.5  127 
Russia  47.0 46.1 45.3 44.5 43.6 43.0 42.4 41.7 40.6  43.8  122 
Ukraine 52.7 52.2 51.4 50.8 49.7 48.8 47.8 47.3 46.8  49.7  140 
* Simple average for 1999–2007 (Moldova – 1999–2006). ** Among 151 countries. 
Source: Schneider, Buehn, Montenegro (2010). 
 
Another characteristic of the region relates to political business cycles in most 
analyzed countries, which influenced expenditures behavior during the crisis in 
Kyrgyzstan (presidential election in 2009), Moldova (parliamentary election in 
2009), Ukraine (parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007, presidential election at 
the beginning of 2010), and Belarus (presidential elections at the end of 2010). In 
addition to their expansionist fiscal policies, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine loosened 
their monetary policy before the crisis, which led to an acceleration of inflation in 
these countries in 2008 (see Figure 2.12). In Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine, 
politically motivated loose fiscal and monetary policies led to increasing current 
account deficits. 
Similar imbalances appear in all analyzed countries except Russia: while in 
2005, only Moldova and Georgia recorded current account deficits (8 and 11% of 
GDP, respectively), in 2008, Russia remained the only country with a current ac-
count surplus; in other countries, current account deficits ranged from 7–9% of 
GDP (Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus) to 16% in Moldova and 23% in Georgia. 
An additional source of vulnerability came from the limited diversification of 
both export and budget revenues. Moldova and Kyrgyzstan largely relied on mi-
grant remittances, and any negative shock on the Russian labor market reduced the 
                                                 
18 This data is somewhat contradictory to doing business rankings (Table 2.1): in 2007, 
Georgia took a lead in terms of ease of doing business and low corruption in the region, 
but at the same time it was one of the outsiders in terms of the share of shadow economy. 
However, compared to the year of budget reform (2005), the informal economy in this 
country fell by 3% of GDP – one of the best results in the world. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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size of remittance inflow. The exports of most countries depended on commodities 
prices. In Russia and Belarus, the share of export duties in total GG revenues was 
very substantial (in 2008, they amounted, respectively, to 14% and 12% of GG 
revenues). 
Thus, before the crisis, the challenges faced by most of the analyzed countries 
were broadly similar: weak institutions, a large informal economy, and external 
imbalances. In some countries, room for economic policy maneuvers was limited 
by changing political cycles. In others, sources of vulnerability such as a high reli-
ance on revenues from energy commodities exports or remittances could hardly be 
addressed quickly.  
 
2.2.5.  Economic and fiscal developments during the crisis 
 
The crisis influenced the economies of the region through a drastic reduction of 
exports and domestic demand (see Figure 2.9). As a result, imports also fell as a 
result of lower domestic demand and depreciating local currencies. Belarus and 
Kyrgyzstan were the two exceptions – investment in these countries increased, 
allowing for an earlier recovery (see Figure 2.4). Moreover, these two countries 
were able to increase production for the domestic market (estimated as domestic 
demand minus imports): in 2009, its contribution to GDP growth amounted to 6.2 
and 6.4 percent in Kyrgyzstan and Belarus, respectively, while in other countries 
of the region it was negative. 
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In 2009, the recession in the analyzed countries was deeper than in the global 
economy: Ukraine recorded the largest decline, followed by Russia, Moldova and 
Georgia, while Kyrgyzstan and Belarus demonstrated small increases in GDP for 
the whole year (see Table 2.5). The decline in Russia added to the region-specific 
factors of deeper recession: among other things, it caused a decrease in migrant 
remittances (which had the greatest effect on Moldova and Kyrgyzstan) and a cut 
in exports of investment goods from Belarus and Ukraine to Russia. 
GDP decline (or significant growth deceleration) was one of the important fac-
tors behind the contraction of general government revenues: in real terms, they fell 
in all countries except Kyrgyzstan and Russia.
19 Moreover, revenues fell faster 
than GDP (with the same exceptions, see Figure 2.10a). Falling imports appeared 
to be one of the factors behind this phenomenon; although it contributed positively 
to GDP growth (from an accounting perspective), it decreased fiscal revenues 
from foreign trade and indirect taxation. 
 
Figure 2.10. Reaction of GG revenues and expenditures to the crisis 


















































































































Source: WEO (April 2011) database. 
 
Tax revenues became the most negatively affected by the crisis’ impact while so-
cial contributions did not suffer at all, at least in relation to GDP (see Table 2.8). 
Among tax revenues, taxes on corporations and other enterprises as well as taxes on 
international trade and transactions suffered the most due to the reduction of profit 
                                                 
19 In 2009, Kyrgyzstan faced a significant inflow of grants from foreign governments and 
international organizations; general government revenues in Russia remained unchanged in 
real terms thanks to an increase in ‘miscellaneous and unidentified revenue’. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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and contraction of foreign trade. In Belarus, tax revenues fell by 7.6% of GDP
20. 
Georgia’s tax system appeared to be the most resilient to the crisis: tax collection fell 
by just 0.5% of GDP, while the major reduction in revenues was the result of re-
duced grants from foreign governments
21. Kyrgyzstan, on the contrary, compensated 
for losses in tax revenue with a substantial inflow of foreign grants. Russia and, to 
some extent, Belarus were able to increase sources of “other revenue”
22. 
 
Table 2.8. Crisis impact on GG revenues (% total revenues) 
  2008 2009  change  2008 2009  change 
  Belarus Moldova 
Taxes 72.4  63.6  -8.8 60.3 55.1 -5.2 
Social  contributions  21.5 24.3  2.9 25.8 29.4  3.6 
Grants  0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.8 0.8 
Other  revenue  6.1 12.0  5.9  9.9 10.6  0.8 
  Georgia Russia 
Taxes  81.2 83.4  2.2 53.3 43.3  -10.0 
Social  contributions  0.0 0.0 0.0  11.0  11.6 0.6 
Grants  10.5 7.4  -3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other  revenue  8.3 9.3 1.0  35.7  45.2 9.5 
  Kyrgyzstan Ukraine 
Taxes 63.9  55.7  -8.2 55.0 53.1 -1.9 
Social  contributions  12.9 13.2  0.3 30.3 30.9  0.6 
Grants  6.3  16.1 9.8 0.0 0.2 0.1 
Other  revenue  17.0 15.1 -1.9 14.7 15.9  1.2 
Source: own estimates based on GFS data, except Kyrgyzstan, which is the result of own 
estimates based on IMF (2010) and WEO (April 2011) database. 
 
GG expenditures behaved counter-cyclically in all countries of the region ex-
cept Belarus
23 (see Figure 2.10b). All countries increased social protection expend-
                                                 
20 Belarus appeared to be a ‘special case’, because before the crisis, the government had 
introduced additional duties for the biggest exporters, mainly exporters of oil products. 
When oil prices fell drastically in 2009, the profitability of oil refineries shrank, and the 
government lost this revenue source. 
21 However, this decrease was caused by the high base of 2008, when Georgia received a 
lot of  foreign grants after its armed conflict with Russia. 
22 In Belarus, ‘other revenue’ grew thanks to the ‘sales of goods and services’ item and the 
‘incidental sales by nonmarket establishments’ sub-item; in Russia all increase was related 
to ‘miscellaneous and unidentified revenue’. 
23 Again, the special case of Belarus was related to the financial settlement scheme be-
tween the government and the oil refineries: a large portion of ‘economic affairs outlays’ 
were directed as a subsidy to oil suppliers. The decrease in oil prices caused not only a 
reduction in revenues from export duties, but also lower expenditures on these subsidies. 
Expenditures other than economic affairs increased in 2009 by 0.9% of GDP. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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itures, and almost all (except Belarus) increased expenditures on education and 
health
24 (see Figure 2.11). Three countries  (Georgia, Russia and Kyrgyzstan)
25 
increased spending on economic affairs (others reduced them). Russia cut general 
public services outlays and increased defense spending, while Georgia did the 
opposite. 
 
Figure 2.11. Changes in the structure of general government expenditures in 2009,  
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Source: own estimates based on the data from GFS and WEO (April 2011) databases, 
except Kyrgyzstan – own estimates based on the data from the Ministry of Finance of 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
The reduced revenues and growing expenditures led to an emergence or in-
crease of fiscal deficits in all countries (see Figure 2.10b) and an increase in the 
public debt (see Table 2.9). The debt–to-GDP ratio additionally deteriorated as a 
result of the GDP decline and the depreciation of national currencies. GG debt 
increased mainly through external borrowing because domestic sources were ex-
tremely limited. Companies also increased their borrowing – gross external debt 
grew faster than general government debt in all countries except Moldova. 
 
                                                 
24 International data sources provide different data on health expenditures. In Section 2, we 
use the GFS database, as it contains the whole functional classification of GG outlays. In 
section 4 (health), the WHO database is used, as it provides more detailed and comprehen-
sive data on health expenditures. For overall health outlays, numbers are somewhat differ-
ent and in some cases the direction of change is different too (e.g., in Ukraine, the IMF 
data shows an increase in health expenditures, while WHO data shows no change). 
25 See Mogilevsky (2011) for details. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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Table 2.9. Debt behavior in 2009, % of GDP 
 Belarus  Georgia  Kyrgyzstan  Moldova  Russia  Ukraine 
GG gross debt (foreign and domestic) 
2008 11.5 27.6 48.5 21.6  7.9 20.5 
2009 20.0 37.3 58.4 31.6 11.0 35.3 
Change  8.6 9.7 9.9  10.0 3.1  14.8 
External debt stocks (including private) 
2008 20.2 26.4 48.0 57.2 24.1 51.7 
2009 34.8 39.4 63.3 63.0 30.9 82.0 
Change  14.5 13.0 15.4  5.8  6.8 30.3 
Sources: GG gross debt – WEO database (April 2011); external debt stocks – own esti-
mates based on WDI-GDF database. 
 
After the pre-crisis inflation surge in 2008, inflation fell in all the countries in 
2009, mostly as the result of much tighter monetary conditions (caused by the 
global financial crisis and massive capital outflow) and the decrease of global 
commodity prices (see Figure 2.12). It seems that domestic monetary policies had 
a limited impact on inflation trends in both 2008 and 2009.  
 




















Source: WEO database (April 2011). 
 
The overall macroeconomic and fiscal impact of the crisis can be summarized 
as follows. First, the recession in the region caused a natural reduction of the tax 
base and, hence, a reduction of GG revenues. Second, as the recession in each 
country resulted from a combination of economy-specific factors, it had various 
impacts on individual revenue sources. For instance, the same reduction of total 
exports led to much bigger loses in tax revenues in countries that heavily relied on THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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export taxes (like Russia and Belarus). On the other hand, countries with a bigger 
share of informal economy recorded a smaller reduction of tax revenues. Third, all 
countries preferred to keep GG expenditures the same as previous levels and, as a 
result, had deteriorated fiscal balances. The deficits were financed mainly via ex-
ternal borrowing. Also, all countries depreciated their currencies against the USD, 
which not only increased their debt/GDP ratios, but also increased the tax base of 
some taxes. The structure of expenditures also changed, but apart from the in-
crease in spending on social protection, there was no common trend for all coun-
tries of the region. Health and education expenditures (as a ratio to GDP) either 
remained almost unchanged (Belarus) or were increased slightly (other countries). Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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3. Education 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze government policies and budget 
spending on education, as well as the outcomes of these policies, and to provide 
extended coverage of the crisis’ impact on the sector’s financing and performance. 
In the analyzed countries, the crisis impact appeared to be diverse and was deter-
mined by the (1) government policy; (2) fiscal space (severity of the crisis’ impact 
on GG revenues) and (3) reform progress in the sphere of education.  
 
 
3.1.  Education systems and education policy in the 2000s  
 
3.1.1.  Participation 
 
The analyzed countries inherited a well-developed but expensive system of ed-
ucation from the Soviet period, a system which is more common in countries with 
much higher levels of GDP per capita. Therefore, the main policy goal during the 
transition period was to sustain the already achieved level of education. The first 
decade of transition brought about a decline in funding, arrears in teachers’ sala-
ries, a lack of heat and maintenance in many schools, etc., which contributed to a 
decline in education quality. Differences in education opportunities have emerged; 
enrollment rates have fallen sharply and public expenditures have shrunk across 
post-Soviet countries, albeit the scale and pace of deterioration varied greatly. On 
the contrary, during the 2000s, the FSU countries have accomplished some pro-
gress in education. In particular, participation in pre-primary and tertiary education 
has increased considerably, although wide disparities remain across countries.  
In the 2000s, enrolment
 in pre-primary education has increased in all countries 
under analysis both in absolute and relative terms. Internationally comparable net 
enrolment ratios
26 (2008) in European FSU countries far exceed the respective 
figures in the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) and are very close to the levels of 
                                                 
26 Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) is defined by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics as enrol-
ment of the official age-group for a given level of education expressed as a percentage of 
the corresponding population. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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the EU NMS and some of the EU candidate countries (90% in Belarus and 71-
73% in Russia and Moldova).
27 For comparison, in CCA, pre-school NERs are 
several times lower – 45% in Georgia, 22% in Azerbaijan, 39% in Kazakhstan and 
14% in Kyrgyzstan. In the majority of FSU countries, the share of enrolment in 
private pre-school institutions remains exceptionally low (except for 5% of the 
total enrolment in Kazakhstan and 4% in Belarus, the level typical for most EU 
NMS), not exceeding 2% in Russia and Ukraine and 1% in Kyrgyzstan. 
The major barriers to participation in pre-school programs are distance (e.g. in 
remote villages or settlements lacking adequate infrastructure facilities) and inade-
quate financing at the municipal level, resulting in a pronounced shortage of free 
or subsidized places in kindergartens. In Russia, for example, 1.68 million chil-
dren, or almost a third of the respective age group, were on the waiting list for 
obtaining a place in pre-school institutions as of January 1st, 2010 (Mizulina 
(2010)). The acute shortage of such institutions in many countries (Ukraine, Bela-
rus, Kazakhstan) is one of the reasons for the continued high poverty levels among 
women, particularly in single-parent families or families with many children, as 
young mothers are often compelled to abandon their jobs completely or to change 
employment in favor of low-paid, unskilled jobs allowing for more flexible work 
hours. This situation forces many young or “potential” mothers to make a tough 
choice between having children or pursuing professional development (ISGP 
(2008)). 
In primary education (ISCED level 1, usually grades 1 – 4)
28, as a result of the 
prevailing demographic trends, the past decade brought about a considerable de-
crease of the respective age cohorts in all analyzed countries (see Figure 3.1). Still, 
all countries maintained relatively high rates of school participation as measured 
by gross enrolment ratios (GER)
29, and were close to the respective levels demon-
strated by the EU NMS. In the decade of the 2000s, the CCA recorded steady pro-
gress towards universal primary education (UPE) by increasing GER, sometimes 
over 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged pupils because of 
early or late entrants, and grade repetition. This could be seen as improvement 
over the 1990s, when armed/ethnic conflicts and transformation shocks severely 
affected the population. During the same period, in the European FSU countries, 
                                                 
27 The pre-primary NER figures are not strictly comparable as national statistics differ in 
their coverage of the respective age groups – e.g. from 3 to 6 years in most FSU countries 
but from 3 to 5 years in Belarus and Ukraine. 
28 In Georgia, primary education lasts for six years starting from age six.  
29 UNESCO defines GER as total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of 
age, expressed as a percentage of the eligible official school-age population corresponding 
to the same level of education in a given school year. For the tertiary level, the population 
used is the five-year post-secondary school age group. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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these indicators decreased slightly from over 100% to the standard average Euro-
pean rates.  
 
Figure 3.1. Gross enrolment rates in primary education (latest year available) and 
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Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
 
As concerns the NER (an indicator with a rather low country coverage in the 
UNESCO database), the analyzed countries displayed varying trends during the 
decade. By the end of the 2000s, NERs ranged from 83.4% in Kyrgyzstan and 
87.7% in Moldova (2008) to 98.7% in Georgia. The available data allows us to 
conclude that since the beginning of the decade, the NER decreased somewhat in 
Ukraine (from 90.8% in 2002 to 88.6% in 2009), in Kyrgyzstan (from 86.7% in 
2000 to 83.5% in 2009), in Moldova (from 90.0 in 2000 to 87.5 in 2009) and un-
derwent a considerable decrease in Armenia (from 90.6 in 2001 to 84.1 in 2007). 
The falling primary enrolment levels in the poorer countries of the region can be 
partly explained by the unofficial migration of children whose parents were work-
ing permanently abroad, and/or by the financial difficulties that many families 
were facing in terms of sending their children to school. Three FSU countries – 
Tajikistan, Moldova and Georgia – have displayed insufficient progress in achiev-
ing the UN Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education and are 
unlikely to achieve this goal by 2015 (UNDP (2008)). THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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On the other hand, an increase of the NER was registered in Belarus (from 
93.3% in 2001 to 94.4% in 2008, with a noticeable reduction in the middle of the 
decade), in Georgia (from 91.4% in 2004 to 99.6 in 2009), in Kazakhstan (from 
87.2% to 89.0% in 2009), and in Azerbaijan (from 89.5 in 2000 to 96.0% in 2008), 
while in most of the EU NMS it is close to 95%. 
According to UNESCO estimates, almost all children who enroll in primary 
school in the countries under review complete their primary schooling.
 Still, geo-
graphic isolation, extreme poverty, social exclusion, disability and conflicts do 
have an effect. According to various estimates, 5% to 7% of the FSU primary 
school age children remained out of school in 2007 (UNESCO (2010). Getting all 
children into and through primary education requires a much stronger focus on 
marginalized children. It is also possible that the global financial crisis may have 
reversed some of the positive trends. 
In terms of general secondary education (ISCED levels 2 and 3), Figure 3.2 
shows that during the past decade, almost all FSU countries (except for the three 
in the CCA region) experienced a considerable decrease in their school age popu-
lations, with the most substantial reduction demonstrated by the European FSU 
countries and Georgia. In the majority of FSU countries, GER for secondary edu-
cation, being generally close to the maximum, remains at a slightly lower level 
compared to EU NMS. 
 
Figure 3.2. Gross enrolment rates in secondary education (latest year available) and 
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Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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In the 2000s, secondary GER has grown in the majority of FSU countries, ex-
cept for Ukraine and Russia, where a reduction was registered. As concerns dis-
aggregation between the two levels of secondary education (lower vs. upper sec-
ondary), the trends vary between countries. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, enrol-
ment in lower secondary education increased, but declined somewhat at the upper 
secondary level. In Russia and Ukraine, the GER declined both in lower and in 
upper secondary education. By the end of the decade, the lower secondary GER 
surpassed 100% in a number of countries (113.5% in Belarus, 104.3% in Kazakh-
stan, and 100.9% in Azerbaijan), while in Russia and Moldova, this indicator fell 
to below 90%. Interestingly, in some countries, the GER at the upper secondary 
level does not differ much from enrolment at the lower secondary level, being just 
2 - 5 pp lower (Russia, Ukraine). Meanwhile in Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, this difference exceeds 10 pp. On the contrary, in 
Georgia and Azerbaijan, the GER for upper secondary education exceeds that of 
the lower secondary level.
30  
Vocational education and training (VET). Technical and vocational education 
programs can strengthen the transition from school to employment, offer second 
chances, and help combat marginalization. VET is offered through a wide array of 
institutional arrangements, public and private providers, and financing systems. 
The available statistics do not allow for a direct comparison of the enrolment 
numbers in various forms of vocational education between countries. Still, empiri-
cal evidence suggests that during the transition, VET, particularly its PVE seg-
ment, had shrunk following the collapse of the state enterprises’ potential to pro-
vide training for a specialized workforce. For example, in Moldova, half of the 
vocational schools were closed, mainly in smaller towns, while in Chisinau, the 
number of PVE students declined threefold (ETF (2010)). In Georgia, the number 
of PVE students was reduced by about 7 times since 1989; in Kyrgyzstan, this 
decline was about 40% with an accompanying shift towards shorter (one-year) 
programs. With declining investment, obsolete equipment, old curricula and aging 
teaching staff, this sector is losing its attractiveness to students. A partial exception 
is Belarus, where enrolment in secondary specialized education increased by 16% 
since 1990, while that of vocational training declined by one fourth but started to 
grow again in the late 2000s due to increased government funding.  
                                                 
30 In Georgia, in the course of the reform of vocational education, the general educational 
component was removed from the program of initial and secondary professional education. 
This caused a number of pupils to return to general public schools from vocational institu-
tions to finish secondary education. This is the main reason why the enrolment in upper 
secondary level exceeded that of lower secondary. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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Tertiary education. During the past decade, the considerable increase in the ter-
tiary school age population (ISCED 5 and 6) in Russia, Moldova as well as in CA 
was accompanied by growth in tertiary enrolment ratios (see Figure 3.3). In most 
countries, this increase was fueled by evidence that a university degree offered a 
greater chance of employment in the labor market. The tertiary GER grew from 
53.4% in 2000 to 77.0 % in Belarus (2009), from 55.2% to 77.2% in Russia 
(2008), from 48.9% to 79.4% in Ukraine (2008), from 23.6% to 50.1% in Armenia 
(2009), from 28.2% to 41.1% in Kazakhstan (2009) and from 34.7% to 50.8% in 
Kyrgyzstan. During the same period, a tertiary GER reduction was registered only 
in Georgia (from 38.0% to 25.5% in 2009) and in Azerbaijan. As a result, tertiary 
enrolment in European FSU countries (except Moldova) currently exceeds that of 
most of NMS and is close to the EU15 level, while in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, it 
is on par with enrolment in India. 
 
Figure 3.3. Gross enrolment rates in tertiary education (latest year available) and 
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Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
 
Apart from demographic factors, the upsurge of tertiary GER in most countries 
was associated with the expansion of private higher education institutions (HEI) 
and the growing proportion of students enrolling on fee-paying conditions: the 
major factors were the removal of artificial restrictions on HEI admission, coupled 
with increasingly lenient eligibility requirements and more affordable tuition fees 
(often going hand in hand with declining education quality). Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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FSU countries have moved away from having the same starting age of compul-
sory education during the Soviet period (7 years old); primary education now be-
ings at the age of 6 in Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and at the 
age of 7 in the remaining countries. Compulsory education ends at the age of 14 in 
Belarus, Armenia and Georgia, at the age of 15 in Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, at the age of 17 in Azerbaijan, and at the age of 18 in 
Uzbekistan. Thus the duration of compulsory education varies from 8 years in 
Armenia through 9 years in Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Turkmenistan, 10 in Russia, 11 in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and in Ukraine, to 
12 years in Uzbekistan. The 3A upper secondary level of education begins at the 
age of 15 in most of the countries, except for Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, where it starts at 16. 
 
Figure 3.4. Expected years of schooling, primary to tertiary (latest year available) 
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Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
 
To compare the education systems of individual countries, looking at a com-
plementary indicator of expected years of schooling may be useful. The indicator 
below shows the number of years of schooling that a child entering school can THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates were to stay 
the same throughout the child’s life.
31  
As Figure 3.4 suggests, expected years of schooling are correlated with national 
per capita GNI (r
2=0.69), and the countries under review are generally characterized 
by lower values of this indicator as compared to the majority of EU NMS. Relative-
ly higher school life expectancy is characteristic for Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Bela-
rus, which are comparable to Slovakia, Poland and Romania, as well as for Russia, 
which is only slightly ahead of SEE countries. During the past decade, some of the 
laggard countries demonstrated a rapid growth of school life expectancy, e.g. Tajiki-
stan (15.3%), Georgia (12%), Azerbaijan (9.6%) and Armenia (9.5%), while the 
largest gains were seen in Kazakhstan (21.7%) and Ukraine (13.4%). 
 
3.1.2.  Education quality 
 
Availability of teachers. In order to achieve good learning outcomes, countries 
need to ensure that sufficient school space is provided, school systems function ef-
fectively, and there are enough teachers to ensure the appropriate quality of educa-
tion. In particular, how teachers are deployed across schools says a lot about the 
efficiency and effectiveness of school systems. The widely used pupil-teacher ratio 
(PTR) indicator could be considered, depending on the circumstances, as a proxy for 
measuring both education quality and its efficiency. In 2008, the average primary 
(and secondary) student-teacher ratios amounted to 39 (32) in South and West Asia, 
23 (17) in Latin America, and 14 (13) in North America and Western Europe 
(UNESCO-UIS (2010)). Several FSU countries, especially the European ones, are 
characterized by lower PTRs (particularly in secondary education) as compared to 
OECD countries (see Figure 3.5), reflecting inefficient resource allocation.  
In the decade of the 2000s, the prevailing PTR trends were largely determined by 
demographic processes, i.e. a decrease of pupil cohorts, which was not always ac-
companied by a proportional reduction in the teacher workforce. In pre-primary 
education, a PTR decrease was registered only in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while 
the majority of the analyzed countries demonstrated growth in this ratio. Still, the 
dispersion of PTR values remained considerable: from 6.1 in Belarus to 27.2 in Ta-
jikistan. On the contrary, in primary education, the prevailing trend was a PTR re-
                                                 
31 This indicator has several limitations for use in comparative studies: e.g. the length of 
the school year and the quality of education are not the same in every country; the indica-
tor also does not directly take into account the effects of repetition (some countries have 
automatic promotion while others do not). The coverage of different types of continuing 
education and training also varies across countries. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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duction (in Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uz-
bekistan). As concerns secondary education, PTR decreased in the European FSU 
countries and Kazakhstan, and increased in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan.  
 

























Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
 
Apart from demographic trends, low (and declining) PTRs in most FSU coun-
tries  seem to be related to (1) the slow pace of optimizing school networks and (2) 
settlement patterns which necessitate maintaining schools with small and unfilled 
classes in distant rural areas. As a result, teachers experience difficulties in teach-
ing multiple subjects at the early levels of schooling, which has a negative impact 
on education quality. 
Teachers’ qualifications are another important factor determining the quality of 
education. While the majority of teachers in high-income countries are trained at 
the tertiary level, many developing countries have high proportions of untrained or 
poorly trained teachers. The available statistics (UNDP (2010)) indicate that many 
of the FSU countries managed to employ a skilled teacher workforce: in 2005-
2008 in Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the share of adequately trained 
primary school teachers exceeded 95%, while in Armenia it amounted to 77.5% 
and in Kyrgyzstan to 64.4%. Teachers should not only be well-trained but also 
well motivated to teach. Unfortunately, the education sphere remains one of the 
most “underpaid,” with average wages being considerably lower compared to THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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country averages, ranging from 59% in Kyrgyzstan, 66.6% in Russia, 74% in Bel-
arus to 84.5% in Ukraine. This, in turn, discourages more qualified and skilled 
personnel from working in schools and prevents teachers from further developing 
their competences (Steiner-Khamsi and Harris-Van Keuren (2008)). Moreover, 
under budget constraints, especially in a time of crisis and post-crisis recovery, 
low salaries increase the risk of recruiting less qualified teachers. This, in turn, 
aggravates one of the painful problems in the analyzed countries: many teachers 
lack some of the basic competencies, for example, computer skills, in which they 
often lag behind their students. 
To evaluate the countries’ education quality in terms of outcomes, international 
programs for the assessment of pupils' scholastic performance such as PISA (Pro-
gramme for International Student Assessment), TIMSS (Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study) and PIRLS (Progress in International Reading 
Literacy Study) may be instrumental. Individual countries’ results could serve as a 
measure of efficiency of public spending on secondary education..  
As only seven FSU countries participate in the above-mentioned programs, and 
only one (Russia) takes part both in PISA and TIMSS, a full cross-country com-
parison is not possible. Still, judging by educational outcomes in reading, science 
and problem solving, derived from PISA data for 2003 - 2009, the differences 
between the OECD average scores and respective scores for Russia, a FSU leader 
in education, remain significant and do not tend to decrease. In 2009, pupils’ re-
sults in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were the lowest decile of the countries’ sam-
ple, with Kyrgyzstan (having the lowest public spending per student) closing the 
ranks. As Figure 3.6b suggests, many participating countries with moderate eco-
nomic potential achieved higher results. Moreover, all four FSU countries taking 
part in PISA are located below the trend curve, which is indicative of below aver-
age efficiency in terms of resource use. 
In TIMSS 2007 tests, FSU countries, and particularly Russia, fared considera-
bly better compared to their PISA scores (Figure 3.6a), with Russia displaying 
higher than average results both in mathematics and science, and Armenia and 
Ukraine being close to average. This dissimilarity could most probably be attribut-
ed to differences in the design of the assessments themselves, such as PISA's 
greater focus on applications and TIMSS's greater alignment with school curricula. 
In general terms, TIMSS seeks to determine “what students know” while PISA 
seeks to determine “what students can do with their knowledge”. This hypothesis 
is corroborated by a growing lag (as demonstrated by PISA 2009) between FSU 
and OECD countries in terms of cognitive competencies to understand, use, and 
reflect on textual information. This lag is an indication of a fundamental weakness 
of the post-Soviet education system, namely its focus on memorizing factual and 
procedural knowledge to the detriment of developing learning skills. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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Figure 3.6. Results of international programs for schoolchildren performance  
assessment  
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As comparable assessments of student performance at the university level do 
not exist, the quality of tertiary education can only be measured by proxy indica-
tors, one of them being the position of higher education institutions on the world 
market of educational services. Russia, the major exporter of educational services 
among FSU countries, controls a negligible share of the world market – from 0.5% 
to 1.5% by various estimates, with about a third of this portion accounting for 
students from the “near abroad”, i.e. other FSU countries. Another indicator is the 
international rating of a country’s leading universities and other HEIs, where the 
picture looks equally bleak. Among the leading world university rankings, The 
Times Higher Education World University index
32 includes no HEIs from the FSU 
in the top 200; the reputable Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) 
compiled by the Shanghai Jiao Tong University
33 lists only two universities from 
Russia among the world’s top 500. HEIs from other FSU countries appear only in 
the Webometrics Ranking, which covers over 20,000 universities across the globe, 
with the best of them ranking only 1,443rd (Lviv University) and 1,474th (Bela-
rusian State University).
34 
Numerous examples of the low quality of education at all levels are quite 
common in the mass media as well as in professional discussion in Russia, 
Ukraine and other FSU countries. The issue is often addressed as one of the most 
urgent concerns the countries are facing. The existing institutional regulations 
(uniform state educational standards, licensing of education institutions and state 
accreditation, introduction of unified state graduation exams) are not proving ef-
fective – in part due to design failures, but mostly because of widespread corrup-
tion and lobbying. Actual education standards as attested by diplomas from differ-
ent HEIs are highly differentiated, and this differentiation is growing. The compe-
tition for diplomas on the labor market could hardly serve as a test for education 
quality, since getting an attractive job is often dependent on personal and family 
connections rather than on professional competences. 
 
 
3.2.  Policy reforms in the education sector during the transition 
 
The most important education reforms in CEE countries were decentralization 
and liberalization, a redefinition of education quality, strengthened links to the 
                                                 
32 http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2010-2011/top-200.html. 
33 http://www.arwu.org/. 
34 http://www.webometrics.info/. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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labor market, increased cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness of education, and 
equity (Rado (2001)). In FSU countries, this agenda was complemented by the 
need for a transition from a universal Soviet education model to national ones 
adjusted to particular country specifics, i.e., its financial potential, labor market 
structure and demand, etc.  
Access equity. Shortages in government resources in many FSU countries led to 
a rapid increase of paid education services, i.e., charging tuition fees in public 
education and encouraging the development of private schools.  
As a cross-country comparative dataset on the structure of education expendi-
tures by sources of funding is largely missing, our analysis has to rely primarily on 
panel surveys, experts’ assessments, and anecdotal evidence. The available data 
demonstrate that household education expenditures constitute a sizable proportion of 
GDP (and tend to grow) almost everywhere in the FSU – 0.47% of GDP in Azerbai-
jan in 2005 (World Bank (2010)), 0.79% of GDP in Russia (2009), over 0.8% of 
GDP in Ukraine (World Bank (2008)) and 1% GDP in Kyrgyzstan (2009). These 
figures are much higher as compared to the EU average (0.38% of GDP), and even 
higher than the European maximum (0.7% of GDP in the UK) (EC (2010)). 
Still, in all analyzed countries, the public sector remains the main provider of 
education at all levels. Private provision of education services continues to be neg-
ligible, with non-public schooling covering only a marginal fraction of enrollees, 
except for tertiary education. The percentage of private enrolment in pre-school 
education is noticeable in Belarus (4.4% in 2007), Kazakhstan (4.7% in 2009), and 
Kyrgyzstan (3.6% in 2009). In primary education, the proportion of private enrol-
ment is considerable only in Georgia (8.7% in 2009), with Armenia (1.8%) next in 
line. Secondary general enrolment in private sector schools was significant and 
constantly growing only in Azerbaijan (12.6%) and in Georgia (6.4% in 2009). 
The same countries, as well as Russia, stand out as having high proportions of 
privately financed enrolment in upper secondary technical/vocational education: 
78% in Azerbaijan, 27.5% in Russia, and 24.5% in Georgia (2009).  
In tertiary education, the share of fee-based enrolment in both private and pub-
lic institutions appears to be much higher compared to other education levels. No 
comparable statistics are available to provide direct comparisons, but anecdotal 
evidence suggests that private expenditures in tertiary education have become 
widespread. The proportion of “contractual” students who pay their own tuition 
fees in full (both in public and private HEIs) varies from about a half of the total in 
Ukraine, about two thirds in Russia and 71% in Moldova, to 84% in Kazakhstan 
(OECD – World Bank (2007)). Very few forms of public support to students and 
their parents, like grants and subsidies, are available. One of the few exceptions is THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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Georgia, where about one third of students receive public grants covering from 30 
to 100% of their tuition costs. 
In theory, fees can increase educational spending per student enrolled and even 
improve equity by targeting public subsidies to students from poor families. Selec-
tive charges on some learning inputs can increase the effectiveness of service de-
livery. However, in practice, the poor become disadvantaged. Public expenditures 
on education are usually captured by better-off households
35, excluding poor fami-
lies with more children, which constitute a considerable proportion of the poverty 
profile in the reviewed countries
36. Inequality in education spending contributes to 
inequities in education outcomes, and these eventually translate into further ine-
qualities in income, consumption and employment and are often inherited by fu-
ture generations. Thus ensuring more equity in access to education is closely relat-
ed to the effectiveness of the pro-poor targeting of direct and indirect grants, sub-
sidies and other forms of financial assistance to students and their families. 
The share of private funding is highest at the tertiary level; anecdotal evidence 
suggests that during the past decade this proportion has been growing in almost all 
analyzed countries, reaching 75% in Moldova (UNESCO-UIS (2007)) and 38% in 
Russia (Kuzminov (2010))
37. Compared to tertiary education, the share of private 
funding at pre-school and general secondary levels is insignificant, reflecting the 
marginal importance of private kindergartens and private secondary schools as 
opposed to public ones. In specialized vocational education, the paid forms of 
advanced vocational training, mostly short-term programs, complement a severely 
downsized network of public vocational schools. 
Reform of education structure. The transition to a market economy in the re-
viewed countries has led to a significant restructuring of school systems and a 
decline in the number of vocational institutions and students. It has also led to a 
break in the interrelations between the unreformed VET institutions and the labor 
market. Figure 3.7 demonstrates the existence of a significant gap in the propor-
tion of vocational students between the FSU region, on the one hand, and SEE and 
EU NMS countries, on the other. In several FSU countries, the scarce supply of 
skilled workers is currently hindering job creation, employment and productivity. 
In Russia, for example, a severe reduction in the number of technical colleges 
                                                 
35 In Russia, for example, the most prestigious and best-funded public schools bring in 
three times more students from the most affluent families than from the lowest-income 
families (Konstantinovskiy et al. (2007)).  
36 In Georgia, the poorest students are about 20% less likely to complete secondary school 
than students in the richest quintile, although primary completion rates are comparable 
(UNICEF (2009)). 
37 In fact, in Russia this proportion has declined from over 60% in the early 2000s due to a 
more rapid growth of federal HEI funding as compared to household expenditures. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
 
CASE Network Reports No. 100  50 
(from over 5,000 twenty years ago to about 900 today) was substituted by a con-
siderable increase of tertiary graduates, which led to a depreciation of tertiary edu-
cation skills, with university graduates often taking positions not really requiring 
this level of  education.  
 
Figure 3.7. Technical/vocational enrolment in ISCED 2 and 3 as % of total enrolment 
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Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
 
The issue of restoring a wide network of VET institutions is being discussed in 
Russia with the close involvement of the employers concerned; a new VET strate-
gy based on the decentralization of providers and an increasing role for stakehold-
ers is under discussion in Moldova; in Georgia, two new types of professional 
education institutions, namely colleges and professional education centers, are 
being set up (since 2007). In 2006, Belarus launched a government program of 
VET development that envisaged more integration with secondary specialized and 
tertiary education, and more flexibility with respect to labor market needs, i.e. 
links between enterprises and VET schools, including channeling money from 
enterprises’ innovation funds to support VET schools’ basic assets. 
Integration into the Bologna process became an essential part of the reform of 
tertiary education systems in the majority of FSU countries. Russia joined the Bo-
logna process as a full member in 2003; in 2005, it was joined by Ukraine, Azer-
baijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova; in 2010, Kazakhstan also joined this pro-
cess and Belarus declared the intention to join in 2012. All the countries pursued 
similar goals – to integrate into the European Higher Education Area, to modern-
ize national university systems by means of cooperation with European universi-
ties, to introduce comparable degrees, qualifications and credit equivalency in THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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order to promote the acknowledgment of national diplomas, to assist national stu-
dents and specialists in achieving equal status worldwide, and to increase the mo-
bility of students and university lecturers.  
The progress to date in adapting European norms and standards varies. For ex-
ample, Ukraine is reported to have implemented more of the Bologna Process 
objectives overall, including the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) and the 
degree cycles, while Russia has made progress in the diploma supplement, and 
both countries are at a similar level of quality assurance (Luchinskaya and 
Ovchynnikova (2011)). However, there are also many implementation shortcom-
ings and obstacles. Transparent quality control systems ensuring the proper im-
plementation of Bologna objectives, such as curricula reforms, are virtually non-
existent. HEIs lack the flexibility and autonomy to adapt the curricula and stand-
ards set by national education ministries to Bologna criteria. The hybrid situation, 
in which some new standards and criteria are introduced but important elements of 
the old system have been preserved (Gaenzle et al. (2009)), is typical.
 Both in Rus-
sia and Ukraine, universities, as a rule, offer BSc diplomas in the middle of their 
standard 5 or 6-year specialist programs; the transition to a real MS qualification 
has not been completed yet. More than 90% of all Russian students still choose a 
specialist degree program despite the introduction of bachelor’s and master’s pro-
grams, since the labor market generally regards BSc diplomas as inferior to tradi-
tional education, thus the MS stage remains mandatory for most graduates.  
As was shown above, most countries under review still face serious resource 
misallocation problems, especially in general education, which is has been addi-
tionally aggravated in recent years by the decline of school age cohorts. There is a 
considerable time lag in the reduction of school networks and personnel. The re-
gion still has an excessive number of schools, combined with very low stu-
dent/teacher ratios. In most cases, school management and budget allocation are 
centralized and based on past trends.  
To address these problems, many OECD countries have been adopting the per 
student financing (PSF) approach, which has become a standard practice across 
Europe. Instead of detailed budgets with fixed categories decided by central gov-
ernments, local authorities and/or schools are given fixed amounts of financing 
based on the number of students enrolled in their systems. The assumption is that 
local authorities and schools have a better understanding of how budgets should be 
structured, as well as the incentives to allocate them efficiently. The expected out-
come is that the same size budgets under local control will produce better quality 
education.  
Yet attempts to introduce PSF in FSU countries have encountered serious diffi-
culties: efficiency, quality and equity improvements are possible, but not guaran-Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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teed. The practice demonstrates that the PSF scheme is very sensitive to the local 
environment, i.e. the ability of local authorities to re-allocate resources to/from 
other areas, or the very high costs of closing schools in some regions which out-
weigh the benefits. Local governments and education entities lack real budget 
autonomy and the experience to use flexible financing schemes, etc. Besides the 
financing formula, the required reform should provide for an expansion of the 
autonomy of local authorities and/or education units, as well as clear and transpar-
ent accountability rules allowing for external monitoring of education quality.  
A pilot project on the implementation of the PSF system in three regions of 
Russia clearly showed that it is impossible to achieve efficiency and quality im-
provements if the total amount of education funding is inadequate (World Bank 
(2004)). The institutions which are needed to make the PSF system operational 
and to ensure school accountability, particularly the school-level Boards of Trus-
tees and the mechanisms to strengthen the role of parents, have to be created and/ 
or strengthened.  
A PSF approach in allocating education budgets is either being developed or is 
currently on the agenda in most FSU countries. To date, the PSF system has been 
widely introduced only in Armenia (2005) and in Georgia (2007). Pilot PSF 
schemes on various scales were in operation in Russia (since 1998), Kyrgyzstan 
(2006), Tajikistan (2005), and Uzbekistan (2008). The issue is being actively dis-
cussed in Azerbaijan and Moldova, while in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, the 
process has not yet started or is still in very early stages (Sondergaard (2010)). 
 
 
3.3.  Spending trends before and during the crisis 
 
The share of GDP spent on education is often seen as a measure illustrating the 
degree of support to this sector. This proportion varies from 2.8% in Armenia and 
Kazakhstan to 9.6% in Moldova. Surprisingly, major oil exporters (Russia, Ka-
zakhstan and Azerbaijan) demonstrate quite modest shares. In the decade of the 
2000s, spending increased in Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan 
but decreased in Belarus. Still, the region’s average remained lower than the EU27 
average of 5.1% of GDP in 2001-2006 (EACEA (2010)). However, according to 
UNESCO data, the median of European FSU countries (5.2% of GDP in 2007) 
was higher than in EU NMS (median of 4.8% of GDP; from 3.6% in Slovakia to 
5.7% in Slovenia). In CA, education spending increased in recent years, but their 
median (3.4% of GDP) remained lower than in European FSU countries. This is 
even more relevant for the Southern Caucasus, that have a median share of just THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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2.7% GDP. During the past decade, Moldova, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
recorded considerable growth in public expenditures on education, surpassing 
GDP growth rates. In CA, this growth resulted, to a great extent, from a growing 
share of a younger population.  
The share of government budget allocated to education varied greatly: from ca. 
20% of total expenditure in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Ukraine to less than 8% in 
Georgia (data for 2007). Public expenditures in Russia (about 12% of the consoli-
dated budget) were at the level of EU NMS median, while they were considerably 
lower in Belarus – about 9%.  
In the 2000s, the size of public education spending evolved in different direc-
tions: in Kyrgyzstan, the share of education expenditures in the total budget re-
mained high during the whole decade; in Moldova and Ukraine, the share in-
creased considerably (respectively by 25% and 37%), while in Belarus, spending 
shrank by almost one third. In Armenia, this share remained almost unchanged 
throughout the decade (about 12% of the total), while in Azerbaijan, it was re-
duced by almost 60%, and by the end of the decade it stayed at a relatively low 
level of 9%. However, the analytical value of this indicator is limited as it does not 
take into account the number of students and gives no information on unit cost per 
student. 
The share of public expenditure allocated to education can only illustrate “pub-
lic commitment to education” or “national effort” to finance education (Motivans 
(2010)). Figure 3.8 presents a comparative picture of such “national efforts” 
against “size of government”, i.e., the share of GG expenditure in GDP of the ana-
lyzed countries. The majority of European countries are characterized by rather 
moderate shares of public expenditures on education (10-15% of GG expendi-
tures) and large government (40-50% of GDP), while most FSU countries (except 
Belarus) represent a different pattern. Russia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, while 
spending similar shares of their budgets on education, have smaller governments. 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan allocate a higher share of their budgets to education due 
to a larger proportion of school-age population. Finally, Moldova and Ukraine 
record both high percentages of education expenditures and a “European size” of 
governments. 
Figure 3.9 presents a cross-national comparison of public expenditure per stu-
dent (at all levels) as a % of GDP per capita. FSU countries demonstrate diverse 
levels of public resources input per pupil: Moldova has the leading position (at 
close to 50% GDP per capita) and is followed by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kyrgyz-
stan, which are close to the level typical for most CEE countries. Other FSU coun-
tries fall considerably behind. On the other hand, if we take into consideration the 
large differences in development levels between the countries, the overall picture Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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will look different. An absolute measure of per student expenditures, controlled for 
differentials in living costs (in USD PPP), allows us to assess the sufficiency of 
public resources allocated to education. By this measure, only Belarus and Russia 
are close to the lowest CEE results demonstrated by Bulgaria and Romania, while 
all other countries fall far behind. These two complementary indicators clearly 
demonstrate that even though in many of the reviewed countries education ex-
penditures have increased considerably in absolute terms (see Table 3.1), per pupil 
education funding still remains low by European standards.
38 
 
Figure 3.8. Public expenditure on education as a percentage of total public expenditure 
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Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, IMF WEO database. 
 
                                                 
38 To control for differences in the age structure (in younger societies with a large number 
of students it is more difficult to reach a comparable level of education expenditure as 
opposed to aging societies), we could compare Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan to countries 
with similar (“young”) demographic structures, like Colombia and Malaysia. In terms of 
per student education expenditure relative to per capita GDP (16.4% in Colombia and 
15.0% in Malaysia), both fare slightly better than Azerbaijan, but considerably worse than 
Kyrgyzstan or Moldova. In absolute terms, however, per student public education spending 
in Azerbaijan is 84% of that in Colombia and 59% of that in Malaysia; for Kyrgyzstan, the 
respective percentages are just 32% and 22%.  THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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Figure 3.9. Absolute and relative measures of public resources allocated to all levels of 
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Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, IMF WEO database. 
 Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
 
CASE Network Reports No. 100  56 
Figure 3.10 plots the level of public education expenditure as a share of GDP 
against the level of economic development measured by GDP per capita in terms 
of PPP. Compared to other European countries with similar GDP per capita levels, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan are below the trend line while Mol-
dova, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine noticeably outperform their peers. Belarus occupies 
a position slightly above the trend line.  
Table 3.1 shows that although in the mid-2000s, a growing trend in public ex-
penditure per student was observed in the region, it was not necessarily transmit-
ted down to all education levels in every country. For example, in Belarus, Ka-
zakhstan and Tajikistan, public expenditures per student in tertiary education de-
creased, probably being substituted by household expenses. In Azerbaijan, tertiary 
education continues to absorb more public resources per student than basic or sec-
ondary levels. In Moldova, spending rates per student are nearly the same across 
all levels of education. The reverse proportion (lower spending for tertiary educa-
tion) is true for Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus. 
 
Table 3.1. Public expenditure per student by level of education, USD PPP 
















2005 2213.9     2369.0
Moldova
2005 785.8    
2006 2660.2     2833.8 2006 891.2     961.4 
2007 2578.7     1984.8 2007 1060.2 881.9 1069.7 1087.5 
2008         2008 1199.41028.3 972.0  1167.2 
2009      1914.0 2009 1362.31204.5 1143.0  1308.2 
Russia 
2005 2033.5     1492.1
Ukraine
2005 1642.1    1817.0 
2006 2390.6     1747.1 2006 1896.2     1955.0 
2007         2007 1824.9    1761.5 
Arme-
nia 
2005 497.3       
Georgia
2005 434.1    
2006 578.9        2006 601.0      
2007 759.5        2007 617.0      
2008  638.0 1093.0 397.7 2008 742.5 713.9 747.2  550.0 
Azer-
baijan 
2005 423.3 268.4 429.5 438.0
Kazakh-
stan 
2005 674.1    488.7 
2006 505.3 319.0 490.0 545.0 2006 886.9     826.0 
2007 564.9      585.1 2007 1088.4     857.9 
2008 738.6      807.2 2008      
2009 1241.3     1492.7 2009        
Kyrgyz-
stan 
2005 296.9      377.1
Tajiki-
stan 
2005 171.8    200.8 
2006 357.2      403.9 2006 181.4     169.9 
2007 465.3      452.4 2007 197.7     195.5 
2008 468.5      381.7 2008 217.4     390.9 
Sources: own calculations based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics database and per capi-
ta GDP PPP from IMF WEO database. 
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A considerable share of public education spending in most countries is directed 
towards primary and secondary education which hypothetically could help im-
prove basic indicators of education attainment. Pre-primary and primary education 
together comprise from around 11-12% of overall GG expenditures on education 
(in various years) in Ukraine to 15-17% in Belarus and Russia and up to 19-21% 
in Moldova. More than 55% of overall education expenditures are spent on sec-
ondary education in Moldova and Russia; in Belarus this share is somewhat lower 
(around 50%), while in Ukraine it hardly exceeds 40%. As for tertiary education, 
Ukraine is the leader in relative funding proportions (around 30%); in Moldova 
and Russia, the respective shares are considerably smaller (17%), and in Belarus 
they account for only 10% of the overall public education funding. This is in line 
with the government policy directed at more commercialization in tertiary educa-
tion in Belarus and Russia, which reduces pressure on public expenditure.  
The proportions of spending for different levels of education within each coun-
try have been evolving over time in response to policy changes. For example, Bel-
arus and Moldova increased their absolute and relative funding of pre-primary 
education during the pre-crisis years. In Belarus, this was the result of the govern-
ment’s desire to meet the social standard in terms of the amount of places in pre-
school institutions (85% of pre-school age children); in Moldova, it was a reponse 
to the under-financing of this level of education in the previous period.  
Education expenditure structure by funding sources. Inadequate funding from 
public sources has been reflected in the increase in private expenditures
39 on educa-
tion in the analyzed countries. It was also stimulated by policies encouraging private 
sector involvement in the provision of education services as well as the expansion of 
fee-based services provided by public educational institutions. Unfortunately, inter-
national statistical sources provide very scarce comparable data on private education 
funding in the reviewed countries. In most cases, these data cannot be obtained from 
national sources either, since apart from official tuition fees, these expenditures also 
include various formal and informal payments, such as fees for extracurricular activ-
ities, sponsorship (“charity”) contributions, charges for board, school security, uni-
forms, repairs, furniture and equipment, unspecified “school needs”, as well as 
spending for private tutors (often representing a disguised bribe for admission), gifts 
to teachers, etc., all of which are common in the FSU region.  
In addition, national treasuries fail to provide information on all sources of fund-
ing. In Russia, for example, expenditures by commercial and-non commercial enti-
ties on education are not included into the total amount of education expenditures. 
Still, according to the Russian Federal Treasury, the proportion of private expendi-
                                                 
39 Private expenditures include tuition fees (and all other payments) by households, busi-
nesses and non-profit associations. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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tures in funding secondary education was close to 15% in 2008, and the volume of 
fee-based education services reached 0.79% of GDP. UNESCO assesses total ex-
penditure from private sources in all levels of educational institutions at 0.5% of 
GDP in Moldova, 0.2% in Azerbaijan, and 0.8% GDP in Kazakhstan.  
Private funding sources are more widespread in tertiary education; and thus 
universities have become less dependent on government budgetary resources. Na-
tional household budget surveys provide data on the growing role of education 
expenditures in family budgets, which negatively affects the equality and accessi-
bility of education. Besides, the perceived connection between private and public 
spending is still weak, and public money spent on education is still considered in 
public opinion to be “free money”. This results in strong social pressure on gov-
ernments to continue free educational services which is proving to be increasingly 
unrealistic due to fiscal constraints. 
In some lower-income FSU countries, international aid is another important 
source of education funding
40. In 2006, donor aid accounted for 10% of total edu-
cation spending in Moldova, 13% in Kyrgyzstan, and nearly 20% in Georgia. The 
raw data on aid in constant 2006 USD also suggest that foreign aid could play a 
significant role in Armenia (USD 38 mn in 2006), Uzbekistan (USD 26 mn in 
2006) and Tajikistan (USD 18 mn in 2006). In most countries, donor aid goes 
primarily to support post-secondary education. This is true for the European FSU 
countries (excluding Moldova in 2006) and the Caucasus (excluding Azerbaijan in 
2005). On the contrary, CA received a higher proportion of donor aid directed at 
basic and secondary education (UNESCO (2009)). In Kyrgyzstan, the donor-
funded Public Investment Program finances capital investments (new construction 
and school repairs, textbooks and learning materials, etc.) and the re-training of 
teachers in pre-schools and primary and secondary schools. 
In view of fiscal constraints, the importance of foreign aid in supporting the 
education sector in low-income FSU countries cannot be overestimated. In the 
absence of international aid, these countries will face problems in protecting 
spending on education. Still, according to UNESCO, while overall aid is rising, 
several major donors are falling far short of their pledges (UNESCO (2010)).  
Recurrent vs. capital expenditures. Expenditures of public-sector educational 
institutions fall into two broad categories – current and capital. Current expendi-
tures include wages and costs related to staff and other current expenditures such 
as maintaining buildings and purchasing educational materials and operational 
resources. Current expenditures represent more than 90% of total spending by 
                                                 
40 Due to data limitations, we can provide only a few examples of the relative importance 
of this source. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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public institutions at all education levels in all countries for which comparable 
data is available (Table 3.2). As far as the tertiary level, the share of current ex-
penditures is a bit lower, although it exceeds 84% in all countries. Spending on 
personnel overshadows all the other categories. 
 
Table 3.2. Public expenditures on education, economic classification, % of total  
Country  Year
Primary, secondary and post-
secondary education  
(ISCED levels 1-4) 
Tertiary education  




























2004 5.1 94.9 27.7 67.3 5.5 94.5 40.1 54.4 
2005 5.1 94.9 25.5 69.5 5.8 94.2 38.9 55.3 
2006 5.3 94.7 23.9 70.8  11.6 88.4  35.1  53.3 
2007        8.7 91.3 37.5 53.8 
2009        5.8 94.2 21.0 73.1 
Moldova 
2006        0.0 100.0 33.3  66.7 
2007 8.3 91.7      12.7 87.3  31.8  55.4 
2008 10.9 89.1  29.5  59.6 13.9 86.1  31.2  54.9 




2002 1.4 98.6 30.5 68.1 0.4 99.6 41.8 57.7 
2003        0.5 99.5 36.2 63.2 
2005 2.8 97.2 27.7 69.6 1.4 98.6 38.2 60.4 
2006 2.0 98.0 24.5 73.5 0.6 99.4 40.5 58.9 
2007        0.9 99.1 46.5 52.6 
2008        1.7 98.3 47.8 50.5 




2002 3.7 96.3 30.2 66.1  20.1 79.9  39.9  40.0 
2004 4.4 95.6 31.2 64.5  22.5 77.5  38.9  38.6 
2005 6.2 93.8 13.7 80.1  17.5 82.5  28.4  54.0 
2006        14.0 86.0  44.4  41.6 
2007        15.4 84.6  43.3  41.3 
Kyrgyz-
stan 
2005        6.9 93.1 32.4 60.8 
2006        7.3 92.7 28.5 64.2 
2007        10.5 89.5  23.8  65.7 
2008        13.3 86.7  20.8  65.9 
Note. Figures in italics are UIS estimates. 
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics database. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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The share of salaries tends to grow over time in all countries and across all lev-
els of education. This trend was particularly evident in 2009, when protecting sala-
ries from a dramatic fall became a policy priority. In Moldova, this was done at the 
cost of capital expenditures, while in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, it was at the cost of 
other current expenditures.  
Capital expenditures represent a considerably smaller portion of overall spend-
ing. Their proportion is 4-5 percentage points higher in tertiary education (as com-
pared to other levels). Kazakhstan and more recently, Kyrgyzstan, are exceptions, as 
their higher capital expenditures reflect more substantial investment in infrastruc-
ture. In most countries, an increase in educational expenditures has not been trans-
lated into increases in their capital component: the large share of wage and utility 
expenditures leaves little funds for other education-enhancing inputs such as text-
books or training materials, as well as for capital outlays such as laboratories, com-
puters, internet connection and the like. Moreover, expenditures for maintenance 
and repair of educational facilities and capital outlays are declining due to the pres-
sure of increasing recurrent spending. Just a few countries (like Moldova and Ka-
zakhstan) tend to maintain (or even increase) the proportion of capital investments.  
At the same time, in most countries, average wages in education remain con-
siderably lower than national averages; this fact is often explained by the persis-
tence of excessive numbers of school staff. Delays in restructuring school net-
works and personnel reduction will not allow for the necessary shifts in the struc-
ture of funding in favor of capital expenditures. On the other hand, the slow 
growth of real wages during the crisis has increased pressure to prioritize this 
spending item and delay capital investments until “better times”. Moreover, budg-
et constraints have put capital expenditures in education at the top of the list of 
potential spending cuts. 
Levels of funding. The division of spending responsibilities among various lev-
els of government differs across FSU countries. The management of financial 
resources is comparatively more centralized in Georgia, where school funding is 
provided mostly by the state budget. Regional budgets are the main source of fi-
nancing pre-primary, primary and secondary education in Belarus, Moldova, Rus-
sia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Financing tertiary education is predominantly the 
responsibility of the central budget in most countries, while the responsibility for 
VET funding is usually split between the regional and central levels, depending on 
the size of the country. 
In the majority of countries, due to considerable budget centralization, the re-
sources of sub-national budgets are, however, very limited and they must depend 
on considerable transfers from central budgets. The largest transfers between the 
central levels and regional/local levels occur in Russia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.  THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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Crisis impact: Policy outcomes. In response to the crisis, countries in the region 
undertook ad hoc expenditure cuts in education aimed at reducing high fiscal defi-
cits. Among the most prominent losers (in terms of shares in total spending) were 
general (basic) vocational and secondary specialized education (in Kyrgyzstan, 
Belarus, and Ukraine) and, to a lesser extent, tertiary (Kyrgyzstan, Belarus) and 
secondary (Ukraine, Belarus) education levels.  
As shown in Table 3.3, individual expenditure items suffered to various de-
grees. A drop in funding for the residual categories, like “other education 
measures and facilities”, “research and development”, “out-of-school education”, 
and the “education facilities material support”, was registered in all FSU countries. 
However, the trend to protect wages and salaries at the expense of capital invest-
ments was not uniform during the crisis. For example, in Belarus, frozen wages 
(for the whole budget sector) became the main instrument for cutting public ex-
penditures in real terms in 2009. During the most severe phase of the crisis (2009), 
the role of categorical grants in education financing increased while the share of 
local budgets’ own funds decreased (Kyrgyzstan and Russia). 
Crisis impact: Quantitative overview. As GDP decreased throughout the course 
of the crisis, education expenditures tended to grow in relation to GDP. For exam-
ple, in Ukraine, GG spending on education went up from 6.15% GDP in 2007 to 
6.43% in 2008, and finally up to 7.3% GDP in 2009. Similar trends were observed 
in all other analyzed countries, with the exception of Belarus (see Table 3.3). Yet 
this indicator only provides evidence that the absolute GDP contraction or reduc-
tion in the rates of growth was more intensive than the decline in public education 
spending. 
 
Table 3.3. Public education spending in pre-crisis and crisis period, % GDP 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
Belarus  5.7 5.1 4.9 5.1 
Moldova 8.0  8.2  9.4  10.3 
Russian  Federation  4.0 4.0 4.6 4.3 
Ukraine 6.2  6.4  7.3  7.1 
Kyrgyzstan 6.5  5.9  6.2  6.2 
Georgia  2.3 2.2 2.7 2.3 
Note. Figures in italics are 2010 budget appropriations or 2010 budget execution prelimi-
nary estimates. 
Sources: National ministries of finance/national treasuries of the respective countries; for 
Georgia, data are taken from the Georgia country study.  
 
In all the analyzed countries, both total public expenditures and education fund-
ing were relatively rigid and displayed slower growth rates or contracted to a less-
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increased during the crisis (2009 relative to 2008), following the growth of total 
real GG expenditures. Moldova and Georgia demonstrated higher rates of educa-
tion spending growth as compared to total public expenditures, while in Russia, 
education expenditures grew slower than overall real GG expenditures. Ukraine 
and Belarus cut education spending, but to a considerably lesser extent than GG 
expenditures. Figure 3.11 illustrates the changes in real expenditure patterns. 
The rigidity of education expenditures means that cuts in education funding 
will probably come with a certain time lag. As mentioned earlier, the bulk of ex-
penditures finances teacher salaries, which cannot be easily adjusted. The govern-
ments are unlikely to lay off teachers and close schools during the school year.  
In 2010 the delayed effect of the crisis was observed in some countries. For ex-
ample, Kyrgyzstan and Russia recorded a contraction in public education funding 
relative to GDP. On the other hand, in those countries where education spending 
was reduced in absolute terms during the crisis (Belarus and Ukraine), it resumed 
its growth in 2010.  
Crisis impact: Efficiency of spending. Higher/lower spending and enrolment do 
not necessarily lead to an improvement/worsening of education outcomes. Re-
search on the link between government education spending and education out-
comes has highlighted the significance of other factors, namely (i) efficiency of 
public spending, (ii) its intra-sectoral allocation, (iii) private education spending, 
and (iv) governance (Grey
 et al. (2007)). 
It is also unclear which (if any) crisis-induced changes in education spending 
patterns will be permanent. Some of the reform initiatives aim at a more efficient 
use of available resources. These include the optimization of school networks, the 
introduction of “funds-follow-student” formulas, and the transfer of responsibili-
ties for school management and funding to municipalities and nongovernmental 
organizations, All of these efforts are aimed at improving incentives for efficient 
resource use and increasing accountability (Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Georgia, Ka-
zakhstan). The reform of the budgetary sector organization in Russia, aimed at 
transforming state-owned (municipal) institutions into autonomous units, is also a 
step towards a transition from cost management to results-based management, 
which enhances cost-efficiency. In Ukraine, the inefficiencies are still rooted in the 
centralized procedures of school budget formation, i.e., administrative limitations 
of staffing, wage funds, teaching hours, etc. Giving greater autonomy to schools 
would remove many of the existing spending inefficiencies and contribute to im-
proving education quality in Ukraine. 
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In the near future, a substantial increase in education funding can hardly be ex-
pected in FSU countries. Realistically, public spending on education is likely to 
decrease in real terms. Therefore a radical improvement in the efficiency of educa-
tion spending and a greater reliance on private resources seem to be unavoidable. 
During the crisis, the countries under review pursued different strategies to im-
prove spending efficiency. In Kyrgyzstan, insufficient government resources were 
increasingly supplemented by household spending on education. In other coun-
tries, these measures aimed at relying more on private resources (e.g., textbook 
rental fees), concentrating the available public resources on priority levels of edu-
cation (e.g. primary and basic secondary education), and/or introducing effective 
feedback mechanisms (e.g. per capita financing schemes, school boards empow-
ered to oversee all financial operations). In Belarus, a clear downward trend is 
observed in real per capita funding for secondary specialized and tertiary educa-
tion. As a result, a greater percentage of HEI students finance education from their 
own pockets or use enterprise funds, while the share of those who study for free is 
declining. Thus we may argue that during the crisis, FSU countries pursued poli-
cies aimed at greater commercialization of secondary specialized and tertiary edu-
cation, thereby reducing pressures on public finances. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
 




4.1.  Health expenditure drivers 
 
The factors influencing health expenditures include the size and organization of 
a country’s health system, the availability of resources within this system, the in-
tensity of utilization of system resources, and the role of government in health 
services provision. Health system performance and health expenditures are also 
dependent on the socio-economic framework and the population’s lifestyle. All of 
these factors are discussed in this section. The dynamics of total and public ex-
penditures on healthcare in six FSU countries are analyzed in section 4.2; the re-
sources spent against health outcomes (mortality, morbidity and equity of access 
to healthcare) are compared briefly in section 4.3. 
To reveal common and country-specific trends in public health expenditures 
during the crisis, both long-term and medium-term trends in the six countries’ 
health systems are taken into consideration. These trends are also compared with 
developments in the health systems of the EU countries and the EU new member 
states (EU NMS). 
The high (in fact, the highest in the world) numbers of inpatient care facilities 
and staff and, at the same time, the rather low number of primary healthcare units 
(below the values in the EU or in the EU NMS, with the exception of Belarus) 
were a typical feature of the Soviet healthcare system (see data for 1989 in Table 
4.1). In this respect, there was relatively little variation between different Soviet 
republics. The extensive network of health facilities in the FSU also implied a 
higher utilization of health services by the population as data in Table 4.2 sug-
gests. Both inpatient and outpatient care indicators in the FSU were higher than in 
the EU and in the then-socialist EU NMS. 
In the course of the post-Soviet transition, all of the republics had to reduce 
their hospital facilities (see 2009 data for the number of hospitals and hospital 
beds in Table 4.1). In the three smaller countries (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Mol-
dova), these adjustments were dramatic – two or three-fold reductions, while in the 
three larger countries (Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine), the number of hospitals and 
beds fell by 20-40%. The trends for other indicators were less homogenous. The 
number of primary health units increased in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, and 
fell in the three other countries. The number of health staff – physicians and nurses Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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– was mostly falling (sometimes radically as in the case of Kyrgyzstan); however, 
in Belarus, the availability of both doctors and nurses increased for the same peri-
od of time. 
 
Table 4.1. Healthcare resources, per 100,000 population 





beds  Physicians Nurses 
1989 2009 1989 2009 1989 2009 1989 2009 1989 2009 
Belarus  8.6  6.8  55.5 58.1 1358 1107 388  511 1  147  1244 
Georgia  7.4  6.0 27.2  11.4  1000 309 497 467  1  068  346 






Moldova  7.7  2.3 13.8  20.9  1273 609 357 310 975 742 







Ukraine  7.2  5.4 12.2  15.0  1301 864 427 315  1  159  784 
For reference: 













Notes. a – data for 2008, b – data for 2007, c – data for 2006, d – data for 2005, e – data for 
1996, f – data for 1985. 
Source: HFA-DB. 
 
Table 4.2. Utilization of healthcare resources 
 
Inpatient care  
admissions per 100 
people 
Average length  
of stay in hospital, 
days 
Outpatient contacts 
per person per year 
1989 2009 1989 2009 1989 2009 
Belarus  26.1 30.0 15.1 11.5 10.5 13.1 
Georgia  14.4 7.2  14.9 6.3 8.2 2.0 




Moldova  24.2 17.8 16.1 10.0  8.6  6.3 




Ukraine  25.2 22.3 16.1 12.7  9.8 10.7 
For reference: 
European 
Union  17.3 17.7 14.0  8.6
a 7.7  6.2 
EU  NMS 17.6  21.0  13.2 7.4 8.9 7.7 
Note. a - data for 2008, b – data for 2006. 
Source: HFA-DB. 
 
The health system output indicators (Table 4.2) of the three smaller countries 
under consideration demonstrated a sharp decline in 2009 in comparison to 1989. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 100  67 
The utilization of health services in Russia and Ukraine fell modestly, and it in-
creased in Belarus in 2009
41 in comparison to 1989. 
The evolution of the health systems (from the point of view of the availability 
and utilization of healthcare resources) could be described using cluster analysis 
(Figure 4.1). As follows from the dendrogram, the systems of all six FSU coun-
tries were, indeed, pretty similar to each other in 1989 and quite distant from the 
EU’s. In 2009, the situation appeared to be diverse: in Belarus, the system re-
mains closest to its 1989 shape; the system resources in Russia and Ukraine are 
now similar to the EU’s 20 years ago; Moldova is now very close to the EU 
NMS; Kyrgyzstan now has resource indicators at levels relatively (and formally) 
close to the modern EU values; finally, Georgia has built a system which is dis-
similar to any other country/group of countries. Thus, Belarus is an outlier, that 
has made the least progress in rationalizing healthcare resources; on the other 
pole, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova have rationalized their systems to the extent that 
they are at least quantitatively comparable to those of the EU and the EU NMS. 
Russia and Ukraine have been implementing a less radical downsizing of their 
systems and still use considerably more resources per capita then the EU. In 
Georgia, the reforms resulted in a system of many small hospitals
42 and physi-
cians and the least developed primary and outpatient care network. 
The demand for health services and health system performance depend on the 
socio-economic status and lifestyle of the population; the health outcomes in 
systems with similar resources could be very different depending on the popula-
tion’s age composition, nutrition status, prevalence of healthy lifestyles, etc. 
Some indicators describing socio-economic factors affecting health status in 
these countries are provided in Table 4.3. The level of urbanization indicates 
how easy/difficult it is to access specialized healthcare services, which are most-
ly provided in large cities or country capitals. From this perspective, the situa-
tion is better in the three larger and richer countries, where the level of urbaniza-
tion is around 70%. In the three smaller countries, half to two-thirds of the popu-
lation live in rural areas; these people have to travel to access health services not 
included in the basic package accessible at primary healthcare units or rayon 
hospitals. 
 
                                                 
41 The average length of hospital stay fell in Belarus, but it fell even more in the EU, which 
did not undergo a radical transformation. So, this seems to illustrate a general trend affect-
ing all health systems. 
42 In 2009, a hospital in Georgia had 52 beds on average (compare with 160-265 beds per 
hospital in other countries/ country groups under consideration). Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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Figure 4.1. Dendrogram of healthcare systems 
 
Note: The dissimilarity measure is average-linkage Euclidean distance based on four in-
put
43 and three output
44 indicators. Case labels consist of the country code (BL – Belarus, 
EU – European Union, GE – Georgia, KG – Kyrgyzstan, MD – Moldova, NM – EU NMS, 
RU – Russia, and UK – Ukraine) and the year code (89 – 1989, 09 – 2009). 
Source: Authors’  calculations. 
 





































2009 2009  2008  2007  2007 2006  2003-2005 
Belarus 73.9  13.6  1.42  3  146  0.29 41.2  15.1 
Georgia 52.8  14.3  1.58  2  859  0.41
a 29.5 6.4 
Kyrgyzstan 36.4 5.2  2.70  2  644  0.33 23.4  5.1 
Moldova 41.5  11.1  1.50  2  771  0.38 23.8  19.2 
Russia 72.8  13.1  1.49  3  376  0.44 47.1  15.7 
Ukraine 68.0  15.7  1.39  3  224  0.28
b 42.6 15.6 
For reference: 
EU 73.8  17.3  1.59  3  481  …  30.9  … 
EU NMS  67.5  16.2  1.46  3 371  …  …  … 
WHO  Europe …  …  … …  …  …  12.2 
Note. a – data for 2005, b – data for 2008. 
Sources: WDI, WHO. 
                                                 
43 All included in Table 4.1 except for the number of primary health care units. 
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Five of the six countries under consideration (all but Kyrgyzstan) have low 
birth and fertility rates (FR) and a large share of population aged 65+. On the one 
hand, this means that the child healthcare agenda in these countries becomes less 
acute and, similarly to the education system, there is the issue of the optimization 
of specialized facilities for child/maternal healthcare. On the other hand, ageing of 
the societies increases demand for other kinds of specialized health services. 
Data on average calorie intake are well correlated with the countries’ GDP per 
capita, the wealthier the country, the higher the calorie intake. The intake values 
for all countries are well above the level of 2,100 kcal/person/day, which is used 
by the World Bank as a basis for the food (extreme) poverty line. Thus, hunger or 
severe malnutrition is not a problem in these countries.
45 However, the relatively 
high Gini coefficient in all countries but Belarus and Ukraine suggests that poorer 
categories of the population may have nutrition problems (not necessarily related 
to the calorie intake; the food structure could be insufficiently balanced) and face 
high risks of some “diseases of the poor,” e.g., TB. 
The prevalence of unhealthy habits (smoking and excessive alcohol consump-
tion) is another potential source of health problems. As follows from the data in 
Table 4.3, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine have a high smoking prevalence and high 
alcohol consumption, both of which are well above the EU or ECA averages. 
Smoking is less of a problem in the three other countries. Moldova has the highest 
level of alcohol consumption in the ECA, while Georgia and Kyrgyzstan have 
lower values. 
The  socio-economic and lifestyle indicators above demonstrate that the group 
of countries under consideration is quite heterogeneous. Some countries have seri-
ous problems with some indicators but less with others. However, other countries 
represent an opposite combination of strengths and weaknesses. Taking country 
specifics into account seems to be important as it allows us to anticipate different 
outcomes for different health status indicators. 
The organization of healthcare systems is, of course, a factor strongly influenc-
ing its effectiveness and efficiency. A detailed analysis of the systems’ structure 
and financing mechanisms is outside the scope of this paper.
46 All FSU countries 
inherited health systems that were fully government-owned and mostly govern-
ment-funded. The entire population was formally entitled to all available types of 
                                                 
45 E.g., child malnutrition rates reported in WDI are low (1-3%) for all analyzed countries. 
46 Comprehensive coverage of these issues can be found in the European Observatory on 
Health Systems and Policies (2010) and in the Observatory’s country-specific publications 
of “Health Systems in Transition” series – see Atun et al (2008), Chanturidze et al (2009), 
Lekhan et al (2004), Meimanaliev et al (2005), Richardson et al (2008), and Tragakes and 
Lessof (2003). Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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healthcare services. Private health service providers played a marginal role, and 
private insurance did not exist. Prices for a broad range of medicines were heavily 
subsidized.  
It follows from the sources cited in the previous paragraph that during the tran-
sition period, Belarus and Ukraine introduced minimal changes into the health 
systems inherited from Soviet times, retaining state guarantees of universal and 
unlimited access to free healthcare; no mandatory insurance mechanisms have 
been introduced in these two countries. Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Russia imple-
mented quite deep reforms of their health systems but they have not been complet-
ed yet. All three countries introduced mandatory health insurance (MHI), which 
includes some minimum guaranteed packages of health services available to all of 
the insured population free of charge or with minor co-payment. This, of course, 
reduced the government’s responsibility for the provision of non-guaranteed ser-
vices. Georgia implemented the most radical reform, providing publicly funded 
health services only for the population below the poverty line; people, who are not 
considered poor are expected to pay the full costs of health services themselves. 
Summing up, the FSU countries started their independent development with 
very similar social and economic systems, including their healthcare systems. 
However, after twenty years of transition, the countries’ health systems have di-
verged significantly due to differences in economy size, level of development, 
reform path and implemented policies. 
 
 
4.2.  Public expenditures on health 
 
4.2.1.  Public health expenditures before the crisis 
 
The large variation in all quantitative and qualitative characteristics of health 
systems discussed in section 4.1 results in large cross-country differences in total 
and public health expenditures. The priority assigned to healthcare by a society 
can be measured by the share of total health expenditures in GDP. In 2008, it var-
ied from 4.8% GDP in Russia (the lowest value among the six countries under 
consideration) to 10.7% GDP in Moldova (the highest value, Figure 4.2a). Thus, 
the smallest country in the group (in terms of population, territory and absolute 
size of GDP) spends the largest share of GDP on healthcare, and, vice-versa - the 
largest (in all dimensions) country spends the smallest share of GDP on health. In 
other countries, total health expenditures were in the range of 5.6 to 8.7% GDP. 
For comparison, in the EU, the median share of total health expenditures in terms THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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of GDP was 8.7% in 2008; the median share for the EU NMS was 7.0% of GDP. 
So, Russia spends a smaller part of its GDP on health than most other countries in 
the FSU and Europe; in other analyzed countries, spending measured in % GDP is 
comparable to the medians for the EU and EU NMS. 
 
Figure 4.2. Total health expenditures, 2008 



































































































































































Sources: WDI, WHO. 
 
For healthcare effectiveness, however, the absolute size of expenditures may be 
more important than its value relative to GDP. Comparing the absolute size of 
total health expenditure per capita measured at PPP provides quite a different 
ranking of countries (Figure 4.2b). In 2008, Russia spent 985 current international 
USD per capita – the highest value among analyzed countries. Other countries 
spent considerably less. For example, Kyrgyzstan spent only USD123 per capita, 
which is the lowest value in the group. So there was a seven-fold difference be-
tween the highest and lowest spending per capita. All of these countries including 
Russia spend less on health per capita, not only in comparison to the EU (the 2008 
median value was USD2,941), but also in comparison to the EU NMS (the median 
value was USD1,321). 
The countries also differ widely in terms of the role and absolute size of public 
health expenditures (PHE, Table 4.4). By international comparison, the more de-
veloped a country is, the greater the role of the public sector in financing health 
services (European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2010). However, 
this is not quite true for the six analyzed FSU countries. In terms of the share of 
public expenditure in total health expenditure, Russia – the country with the high-
est GDP per capita – ranks lower than Belarus. On the other end, Georgia, whose Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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GDP per capita is 1.5-2 times higher than Kyrgyzstan or Moldova’s, has a much 
lower share of public expenditure in total health expenditures than those two coun-
tries. These deviations from the global trend originate in the various directions of 
healthcare reforms (or lack thereof) implemented in the post-Soviet period. As 
mentioned in section 4.1, all countries started with fully government-funded health 
systems and relatively low out-of-pocket expenditures and, correspondingly, a 
very high share of PHE in total health expenditures. Belarus was slow to reform its 
healthcare sector; it therefore not surprising that it retained the highest level of 
public expenditures, comparable to that in the EU countries. Ukraine was also not 
an active reformer, so it has a relatively high share of PHE, but it is still lower than 
in Belarus or Russia; the latter fact could be attributed to the above-mentioned 
relationship between the share of PHE and GDP per capita (Ukraine’s GDP per 
capita is two-three times lower than its northern neighbors). Georgia implemented 
the most radical reforms towards privatizing health services, so it has the lowest 
PHE share in total health expenditures. 
 
Table 4.4. Public expenditures on health before and during the crisis 
 2006  2007  2008  2009 
Belarus 
PHE, % of total health expenditure  74.7  74.8  72.2  70.6 
PHE, % of total GG expenditure  9.9  9.5  8.2  8.8 
PHE, % GDP  4.6  4.6  4.0  4.1 
PHE per capita, PPP, current interna-
tional USD   450 506 497 515 
Real growth rate of PHE per capita, %  -1.2  10.4  -3.2  2.9 
Georgia 
PHE, % of total health expenditure  26.8  27.6  30.9  28.7 
PHE, % of total GG expenditure  7.0  6.3  7.3  7.5 
PHE, % GDP  2.3  2.2  2.7  2.9 
PHE per capita, PPP, current interna-
tional USD   91 106 134 143 
Real growth rate of PHE per capita, %  30.2  13.5  23.6  5.2 
Kyrgyzstan 
PHE, % of total health expenditure  46.2  49.2  48.4  50.9 
PHE, % of total GG expenditure  13.3  12.8  11.5  11.7 
PHE, % GDP  3.0  3.2  2.8  3.5 
PHE per capita, PPP, current interna-
tional USD   53 64 60 77 
Real growth rate of PHE per capita, %  27.2  17.4  -8.2  28.1 
Moldova 
PHE, % of total health expenditure  48.4  49.1  50.6  53.7 
PHE, % of total GG expenditure  11.7  11.7  13.0  14.1 
PHE, % GDP  4.7  4.9  5.4  6.4 
PHE per capita, PPP, current interna- 121  134  162  183 THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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  2006 2007 2008 2009 
tional USD  
Real growth rate of PHE per capita, %  20.0  8.7  19.2  12.1 
Russia 
PHE, % of total health expenditure  63.2  64.2  64.3  64.4 
PHE, % of total GG expenditure  10.8  10.2  9.2  8.5 
PHE,  %  GDP  3.3 3.5 3.1 3.5 
PHE per capita, PPP, current interna-
tional USD   504 581 633 669 
Real growth rate of PHE per capita, %  13.0  12.4  -5.5  4.4 
Ukraine 
PHE, % of total health expenditure  56.7  57.6  55.9  54.7 
PHE, % of total GG expenditure  8.9  9.2  8.6  8.6 
PHE,  %  GDP  3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 
PHE per capita, PPP, current interna-
tional USD   243 275 280 244 
Real growth rate of PHE per capita, %  10.1  9.8  -0.1  -14.6 
Sources: WHO, IMF, authors’ calculations based on the country reports. 
 
Another important characteristic of public health expenditure is its share in to-
tal GG expenditure (Table 4.4). Among the countries under consideration, Moldo-
va spends the highest share of public resources on health (13% in 2008); this is 
more than the median value of this indicator for the EU NMS (11.9% in 2008) and 
close to the EU median (13.6% in 2008). In 2008, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine, 
and Belarus – listed in descending order – spent between 11.5% and 8.2% of total 
GG expenditures on health. Georgia, with its relatively small government funding 
of healthcare, was at the bottom of the list, with PHE equal to 7.3% of total GG 
expenditure in 2008. 
PHE as a share of GDP reflect both the share of total health expenditures in 
GDP and the share of PHE in total health expenditure. So, all the variation be-
tween countries observed on the PHE share in GDP – from 2.7% GDP in Georgia 
to 5.4% GDP in Moldova (Figure 4.2a and Table 4.4) – comes from variation in 
the two other indicators. Moldova’s public health spending expressed as a % GDP 
is below the EU median but above the EU NMS median; the governments of the 
other five countries spend considerably less on health than the EU countries.  
Similarly, the absolute level of PHE per capita is dependent on the level of 
GDP per capita and the PHE share in GDP. As result, in 2008, the PHE per capita 
had values from USD633 in Russia to just USD60 in Kyrgyzstan. 
Regardless of their differences in absolute and relative levels of PHE, all coun-
tries demonstrated rapid growth in public health expenditures in real terms in 
2006-2008. A good fiscal situation in the pre-crisis years allowed all governments 
to increase real PHE per capita from 1.8% (Belarus) to 22.2% (Georgia) per an-Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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num on average. It seems that all governments tried to compensate for chronic 
under-financing of the health sector in previous “poor” years; the lower the level 
of PHE in previous years, the higher the compensatory effort. 
Salaries of health personnel constitute the key component of PHE in all coun-
tries. The rapid PHE increase in 2006-2008 mentioned in the previous paragraph 
was accompanied by an even faster growth in the real salaries of health workers 
(Table 4.5
47). In all countries but Belarus, salaries in the health sector grew faster 
than average wages in these economies. The fastest growth occurred in Georgia 
and Kyrgyzstan, i.e., in countries with the lowest absolute salaries (see 2008 data 
for salaries expressed in USD PPP, Table 4.5). So, the catching-up of health work-
er salaries has been taking place in almost all countries and also between countries 
(possibly reflecting some governments’ attempts to reduce incentives for the emi-
gration of health staff to countries with higher salaries). Still, in 2008, in all ana-
lyzed countries, salaries in the health sector were below the economy-wide aver-
age (Figure 4.4). The cross-country variation in the level of salaries was also large 
(more than four times), reflecting the differences in the level of GDP per capita 
and in the government priorities (health workers’ salaries in Moldova are higher 
than in Georgia despite the fact that GDP per capita in Georgia is substantially 
higher). However, it is worth noting that in many of the countries, patients’ out-of-
pocket expenditures are high and are partially spent on direct payments to doctors 
and nurses. These payments are hardly reflected in official salary data, so actual 
salary differentials between healthcare and other sectors of the economy and be-
tween countries may be smaller than indicated in the official statistical data. 
The countries also differ significantly in terms of the roles played by the central 
and local governments in healthcare financing. One can divide countries into two 
groups (Figure 4.3): larger (Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine) and smaller (Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova). In 2008, local governments covered 60-80% of GG 
health expenditures in the three larger countries, while in the three smaller coun-
tries, the share of local budgets was about or below 10% (in the case of Moldova – 
less than 5%). This distinction seems to make sense both from the point of view of 
the size of the systems (it is much easier to manage the financing of healthcare 
establishments from the central level in smaller countries) and from the point of 
view of resource availability at the local level (smaller countries very much de-
pend on indirect taxes, which should be centralized by their nature). Interestingly, 
in Russia, which is much larger than the other countries, the role of local and re-
                                                 
47 In all countries under consideration, statistical agencies publish data for a combined 
health and social care sector. Health personnel outnumber social workers by many times 
and all sector aggregates are dominated by health sector indicators, so data for this com-
bined sector seem to be a sufficiently good proxy for health personnel average salaries. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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gional budgets is considerably smaller than in Belarus and Ukraine; thus, the 
health financing in Russia is more centralized. This also could be associated with 
the heavy dependence on revenues from oil and gas exports, which go to the cen-
tral budget, as well as with the over-centralization of the Russian fiscal system, 
associated with the limited fiscal autonomy of regions and municipalities.  
 
Table 4.5. Average monthly salaries of health and social workers in the countries of 
the region 
 
LCU, current prices Current international 
USD , PPP  Real growth rate, % 




Belarus  716 069  796 819  679  734  8.6  -1.5 
Georgia 306  367  346  428 32.8  17.9 
Kyrgyzstan  3 486  3 909  218  242  20.2  4.9 
Moldova  2 266  2 718  388  461  16.0  20.0 
Russia  13 049  14 820  911  1019  17.4  1.7 
Ukraine  1 177  1 307  420  415  13.9  -4.2 
Sources: Web-sites of the national statistical agencies, WDI, authors’ calculations. 
 




















% of GG health expenditures
 
Sources: IMF GFS, country reports. 
 
In the countries that introduced public health insurance (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, and Russia), a considerable share of PHE is spent by social securi-
ty/MHI funds. According to the WHO data, these funds manage from 39% (Rus-
sia) to 76% (Moldova) of PHE. For comparison, in Belarus and Ukraine, the 
shares of PHE funded through social security funds are <3% and <1%, corre-Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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spondingly. However, less than half of the resources managed by the MHI funds 
come from mandatory insurance payments of private agents (employees and/or 
employers). In 2008, these payments composed 43% of the revenues of the MHI 
fund in Moldova, 30% of the revenues of territorial MHI funds in Russia, and 18% 
of the revenues of the MHI fund in Kyrgyzstan; in Georgia, the social tax has been 
merged with income tax since 2008, so no earmarked revenue source for MHI 
exists in this country anymore. Another source of MHI funds revenue are insur-
ance payments made by the governments on behalf of the economically inactive 
population, and some other revenues. 
As follows from Figure 4.2 and Table 4.4, private health expenditures (PvtHE) 
are important in the analyzed countries. Their share in total health expenditures 
varies from less than 30% in Belarus to more than 70% in Georgia. PvtHE were 
also growing rapidly in the pre-crisis period (Table 4.6), albeit somewhat slower 
than public health expenditures (in Belarus, PvtHE in 2006-2008 grew at a faster 
rate than the PHE). PvtHE in all of these countries consist mostly (70-98%) of 
patients’ out of pocket expenditures for purchasing medicines and direct payments 
to health service providers. The latter are made officially in cases when health 
providers are private establishments or their services are not covered by the state 
guaranteed package. Unofficially, they also finance services which are formally 
covered by the MHI. These unofficial payments are practiced in all the countries 
to a various extent; they can be pretty high in cases of complicated medical treat-
ment/operations and create high illness-associated financial risks for poorer seg-
ments of the population. Private insurance is important only in Russia; in 2008 the 
share of private insurance spending in PvtHE exceeded the median share in the EU 
countries (Table 4.6). This is possibly due to the existence of very large and re-
source-rich companies in the fuel industry, metallurgy, and some other sectors of 
the Russian economy, which are capable of providing attractive social packages to 
their employees. In all other countries, private health insurance either plays an 
insignificant role, or does not exist. 
In some countries of the region, a substantial part of the financing of total 
health expenditures comes from international development organizations (the 
World Bank, the WHO, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Ma-
laria etc.). In 2008, the share of external resources in total health expenditure 
amounted to 12.6% in Kyrgyzstan, 10.5% in Georgia, and 4.7% in Moldova; in 
three other countries, it was very small (<0.5%). These external resources are 
partially recorded in the government budget (e.g., sector budget support in the 
framework of the Sector-Wide Approach in Kyrgyzstan or programs implement-
ed by government agencies outside central budgetary government operations) 
and partially go through NGOs. The above data on the impressive growth of 
PHE in the pre-crisis period does not seem to confirm the concerns about the THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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crowding-out of domestic public expenditures by external resources, which are 
typical for many aid-dependent developing countries. Still, in the longer-term, 
the governments/societies need to eventually replace donor funding with domes-
tic resources, and this will create additional fiscal pressure. 
 
Table 4.6. Private health expenditures 
 
Real annual growth rate 
of PvtHE per capita, % 
Out of pocket  
expenditure  Private insurance 
% of private health expenditures 
2006-2008 
average  2009  2008 2009 2008 2009 
Belarus 9.9  11.4  71.4  67.4  0.1  0.1 
Georgia 5.4  17.0  96.3  94.1  2.1  3.7 
Kyrgyzstan 0.4  15.7  87.2  81.3  0.0  0.0 
Moldova 14.6  -0.9  97.8  97.8  0.4  0.4 
Russia 2.8  3.6  81.3  80.9  10.6  11.0 
Ukraine 5.5  -10.6  92.6  92.9  1.8  1.9 
For reference: 
European Union  …  …  85.4  85.6  8.2  8.2 
EU NMS  …  …  92.7  93.4  1.5  1.0 
Source: WHO, authors’ calculations. 
 
4.2.2.  Public health expenditures during the crisis 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, all economies of the region were adversely affected 
by the crisis. The fiscal situation in 2009 in these countries was much tighter than 
in the previous years. This, of course, had some implications for public health 
expenditures. 
In 2009, the real growth rate of PHE per capita (Table 4.4) fell in comparison 
to 2008 in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and increased in Kyrgyzstan (by 28% 
in real terms!) and in Belarus and Russia. In Georgia and Moldova, 2009 growth 
rates were below the 2008 values, but remained positive. In Ukraine, a negative 
real growth rate of PHE per capita was registered; it was the second consecutive 
year of health expenditure decline in this country. 
In Ukraine the 2009 decline took place while the share of PHE in total GG ex-
penditure remained on at the 2008 level. This means that the priority of health 
expenditures remained high but the fiscal constraints resulted in the reduction of 
health expenditures in real terms. Similarly, health expenditures were a priority in 
Georgia and Moldova; the PHE share increased against the slowdown in total GG 
expenditures growth.  Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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A bit unexpectedly, in Russia, the PHE share in total GG expenditures fell in 
2009 in spite of the recorded increase in real per capita PHE growth rate. This 
could be interpreted in the following way: anti-crisis policies in this country in-
cluded a substantial increase in GG expenditures financed from the oil reserve 
funds. Even though the health sector was not the main recipient of the additional 
resources, it received enough to ensure the accelerated growth of the PHE per 
capita in absolute terms. 
Due to these policies, the share of PHE in GDP in 2009 increased in compari-
son to 2008 in all countries except Ukraine, where it stayed at the 2008 level. Cor-
respondingly, PHE per capita in USD PPP terms (Table 4.4) increased in all coun-
tries but Ukraine; the relative ranking of the countries on this indicator remained 
unchanged. 
As noted above, the role of the private sector is high in some of these countries, 
so the PHE dynamics are not the only factor influencing the crisis-related change 
in total health expenditures. According to the WHO data, private health expendi-
tures have increased in real per capita terms in comparison to 2008 in all countries 
(in Belarus, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan – by more than 10%) but Moldova (where 
they declined to less than 1%) and Ukraine (decline by more than 10%). So, 
Ukraine seems to be the only country in the group which experienced a reduction 
in both public and private health expenditures during the crisis. 
As follows from Table 4.5 and Figure 4.4, the highest increase of average sala-
ries of health workers in both absolute and relative terms was recorded in Georgia 
despite its lagging behind in public health expenditures growth; this was due to a 
17% increase in real private health expenditures per capita in 2009. Health workers’ 
salaries increased in 2009 in real terms in all analyzed countries except Belarus and 
Ukraine. Substantial increases were registered in both Moldova and Georgia. In 
comparison to the economy average, the average salary of health workers increased 
in Georgia, Moldova (the only country in the analyzed group where health workers’ 
remuneration reached the country average), Russia, and Ukraine (where the econo-
my average fell even more than salaries in the health sector). A minor reduction of 
relative salaries in the health sector took place in Belarus as well as in Kyrgyzstan, 
which experienced the opposite of the situation in Ukraine; Kyrgyz economy-wide 
wage growth was stronger than health sector wage growth). 
Thus, as follows from the above analysis, PHE have been mostly protected in 
2009. In Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Russia, PHE have grown in real per 
capita terms; in Ukraine, where total GG expenditures fell dramatically, PHE nev-
ertheless recorded an increased share in GG. In Georgia, the PHE fell in 2009 in 
both absolute and relative terms, but this was compensated by private expendi-
tures, which were the main source of healthcare financing in this country. THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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Sources: Web-sites of the national statistical agencies, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
4.3.  Health expenditure efficiency and medium-term expenditure out-
look 
 
To assess sufficiency and efficiency of total and public health expenditures, it 
is worth comparing the resources spent with the health outcomes. Outcomes in-
clude life expectancy at birth as an integral measure of the health status of the 
population and various mortality and morbidity indicators. 
All countries under consideration except for Georgia went through a substantial 
decline in life expectancy in the mid-1990s (Figure 4.5a). This was related to the 
transformation shock; the EU NMS experienced a similar albeit smaller decline as 
well. In the 2000s, all analyzed countries except for Kyrgyzstan improved in terms 
of the life expectancy indicator; this points to a general improvement in their overall 
health status. Still, in 2009, life expectancy in four out of six countries had not re-
turned to 1989 levels; only Georgia and Moldova have better longevity indicators 
now than they did at the end of Soviet period. In all these countries, life expectancy 
is now much lower than in the EU (10 years or more) and in the EU NMS.  
However, life expectancy in the analyzed countries has very little correlation 
with their income status or health expenditures. The highest life expectancy is in 
Georgia, which is not the richest country in the group; its total health spending per 
capita in USD PPP terms is much lower than that of Russia, Belarus and some-Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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what smaller than that of Ukraine, and, as noted in the previous section, its PHE 
are the lowest among all the countries under consideration. On the other end, Rus-
sia, which has the highest income level and total and public health expenditures 
per capita, lags behind not only Georgia, but also Belarus and Ukraine on life ex-
pectancy, being just a bit ahead of much poorer Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. This 
lack of correlation between life expectancy and health expenditures indicates that 
there are important factors influencing the health status of the population, which 
are not directly related to the healthcare system such as environment, nutrition, 
lifestyle etc. Simultaneously, it also raises doubts about the efficiency of health 
spending in these countries. 
 
Figure 4.5. Life expectancy at birth 

















































































































































Sources: WDI, WHO. 
 
Healthy life expectancy (HALE) is the most relevant integral indicator for de-
scribing a population’s health status. Data on HALE are available for 2007 only 
(Figure 4.5b). For all countries in the region, the gap between life expectancy at 
birth and HALE is 7-10 years. The ranking of countries on HALE is almost the 
same as on life expectancy. 
An analysis of mortality indicators (Table 4.7) allows us to identify some 
sources of the observed differences in life expectancy. First, the FSU countries 
(apart from Georgia) have much higher standardized death rates (SDR) than the 
EU or EU NMS. This is a sort of expected phenomenon: normally, the lower mor-
tality rate, the higher the life expectancy. As follows from the table, the differ-
ences in SDR come, to a considerable extent, from the differences in rates of death 
caused by external factors such as injury and poison. Apparently, the frequency of 
death associated with external causes is much more related to lifestyle factors – THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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alcohol consumption, work and road safety, (un)acceptability of risky behavior 
etc. – than to the development of the health systems and the level of health ex-
penditures. This may be one of the key factors explaining the lack of a direct cor-
relation between health spending and life expectancy. 
 
Table 4.7. Selected mortality and morbidity indicators 
Country 
Standardized death 
































2008 2008  2009 2008  2009  2008 2009  2009 
Belarus 1  181
a 139
a 12.1 15  54.3  9.1  413  2.08 
Georgia 779
b 27
b 29.1 48  107.3 8.0  128  1.56 
Kyrgyzstan 1  203
c 81
c 36.6 81  110.7 10.5 82
e 0.55
e 
Moldova 1  264 100  16.7  32  120.6 22.3 223  1.53 
Russia 1  403
d 188









c  4.2 8  13.5  5.3  475
a  4.13
d 
EU NMS  873
c 59
c 6.3 13  35.9  2.5  442  3.90 
Note. a – data for 2007, b – data for 2001, c – data for 2009, d – data for 2006, e – data for 
2008. 
Sources: HFA-DB, WDI. 
 
Large differences between countries also exist on indicators such as the under-
five mortality rate (U5MR) and the maternal mortality ratio. The values of these 
indicators are much higher in the FSU than in other European countries; they are 
especially high in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia. It follows from the data (Mogilevsky 
(2011)) that there is a strong positive statistical relationship between U5MR and FR, 
i.e., the average number of children born by a woman. A similar positive relation-
ship also exists between fertility and maternal mortality. FR is another lifestyle indi-
cator influencing child and maternal mortality and, hence, life expectancy. So, it is 
no surprise that Kyrgyzstan has the highest U5MR among all these countries; it also 
has the highest FR (Table 4.3). However, while accounting for fertility helps to un-
derstand the differences between the FSU countries themselves, it provides little 
help in explaining the differences between the FSU group (apart from Kyrgyzstan) 
and EU countries. The FR in all these countries does not differ much, but child and 
maternal mortality rates in the FSU are two, three and more times higher than, for Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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example, in the EU NMS. The equation provided in Table 4.8 suggests that, after 
controlling for fertility, U5MR appears to be strongly and negatively dependent on 
public health expenditure per capita (PHEPC), i.e., ceteris paribus, the higher the 
public health expenditures, the lower the child mortality. 
 
Table 4.8. Regression of U5MR on public health expenditures per capita and FR 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C 37.92  8.30  4.57  0.0001 
FR 13.44  1.95  6.90  0.0000 
LOG(PHEPC) -7.30  0.93  -7.88  0.0000 
R-squared 0.959  Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
Note. Dependent Variable: U5MR. Method: Least Squares. Included observations: 27. 
Source: Mogilevsky (2011). 
 
The analysis of selected morbidity indicators in Table 4.7 also reveals the role 
of socio-economic factors. The TB and HIV incidence rates are much higher in all 
FSU countries than in the EU and EU NMS. It is clear that poverty, income ine-
quality, nutrition problems, and risky behavior contribute to the higher morbidity 
rates for “social” diseases. On the contrary, cancer and diabetes morbidity rates in 
the FSU are well below those in the EU/EU NMS. It seems that many people in 
the FSU do not live until the age when diseases typical for developed countries 
become widespread. 
An important function of health systems is establishing equal access to health 
services for the population. However, several factors, such as uneven territorial 
distribution of health facilities and medical staff, unaffordable costs of drugs, offi-
cial payments for services for uninsured people, and unofficial payments for medi-
cal treatment, work in the opposite directions. While comparable data on equal 
access to health services do not exist, available sub-national health status indica-
tors point to large inequalities in this area. For example, according to the national 
statistical agencies, there was a 7.7 times difference between the regions of Russia 
with the highest and the lowest TB incidence rate in 2008; in Ukraine, Belarus and 
Kyrgyzstan in 2009, this cross-oblast difference was 3.0, 1.9, and 2.3 times corre-
spondingly. Even accounting for variation in climate and socio-economic condi-
tions affecting TB morbidity in different parts of these countries, especially in 
Russia, one could conclude that health systems fail to level these differences. This 
seems to be another argument for the inefficiency of health spending in these 
countries.  
Two main messages seem to emerge from this discussion. First, health spending 
is not the only factor determining the health status of population; various socio-
economic factors mentioned in sections 4.1 and 4.3 are also important health deter-THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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minants. From this perspective, in many cases it could be more efficient to imple-
ment policies promoting healthy lifestyles (fighting smoking, excessive alcohol 
consumption etc.) than to rely on narrowly-understood healthcare interventions.  
Second, the absolute level of health spending is what matters for the effective-
ness of healthcare. Relative measures of health spending (in % of GDP or of total 
GG expenditures) are important for describing the degree of priority assigned to 
health issues, but ultimately the per capita spending (together with socio-economic 
factors) determines the health status in a given country. This means that in order to 
improve a population’s health, the analyzed countries need to increase health 
spending significantly. In many of these countries (especially in Russia, which has 
the largest fiscal space and the lowest share of health spending in GDP), this 
would require increasing the share of total government resources allocated for 
healthcare. Most probably, this should also be accompanied by increasing reliance 
on private sources of health financing especially in those countries which currently 
rely heavily on public sources and where there is no fiscal space for further expan-
sion of public health spending (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine). 
In the medium- to long-term, all analyzed countries except for Kyrgyzstan will 
have to increase their health spending due to rapid population ageing. Smaller 
countries will also have to think about the necessity of replacing external financing 
sources with domestic ones. For example, according to the IMF’s estimates 
(2010b), Russia and Ukraine should increase their health spending by more than 
1% GDP per annum over the next twenty years.  
Apparently, the required increase in health spending may create a heavy fiscal 
burden for these countries, four of which are already spending more than 40% of 
GDP (Table 2.6) – a high proportion for their level of social and economic devel-
opment. In such a situation, a radical improvement in the efficiency of health 
spending should be a key priority. Targeting efficiency would require initiating 
politically difficult health reforms in those countries that have hesitated to start 
them so far (Belarus and Ukraine), and continuing them in other countries. This 
includes adjustments in the sector’s physical infrastructure and staff, the introduc-
tion of minimally guaranteed packages of services, well-thought out reforms in 
financing mechanisms with a simultaneous strengthening of primary healthcare, 
increases in investments in modern health equipment, the retraining of health per-
sonnel, and other reforms. Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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5. Conclusions and Policy 
Implications 
During the last twenty years, the analyzed countries went through the painful 
process of post-communist transition, both in economic and political spheres. 
They started this process in the early 1990s with the same common Soviet institu-
tional heritage but different levels of economic and social development. Then the 
various speeds and, sometimes, directions of economic and political reforms, as 
well as other country specific factors such as cultural, religious, and geographical 
backgrounds have made them more and more divergent. Five of them (Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) can be considered market economies, 
although with numerous distortions caused by partial and incomplete reforms. 
Belarus still remains in a relatively early stage of market transition with extensive 
public ownership and remnants of a command system. Generally speaking, all of 
the analyzed countries but Georgia have failed to create a friendly business envi-
ronment and suffer from high levels of corruption. As a result, the region is char-
acterized by a substantial informal economy and shadow labor market.  
The progress in political reforms is even more limited, with all of the countries 
rated in Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” index as either “non free” or 
only “partly free”. The lack of democracy and freedom makes it difficult to fight 
corruption and improve the quality of state institutions, which are so important for 
the delivery of basic social services such as education and health. Nevertheless, 
even under authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, one can observe the pres-
ence of political business cycles which heavily influence government expenditure 
behaviors. Among others, this was the case of Russia (2007), Kyrgyzstan (presi-
dential election in 2009), Moldova (parliamentary election in 2009), Ukraine (par-
liamentary elections of 2006 and 2007, presidential election in the beginning of 
2010), and Belarus (presidential election at the end of 2010). 
After the deep transition-related output decline in the early and mid-1990s and 
the series of financial crises in 1998-1999, the decade of the 2000s was marked as 
the era of rapid economic growth, falling poverty rates (but not necessarily ine-
quality), lower inflation, and a relatively favorable fiscal situation. However, in 
2006-2008, many countries started to experience signs of overheating, with current 
account deficits widening rapidly and inflation pressures growing. In spite of the THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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record-high rates of economic and revenue growth, almost all of the countries 
recorded fiscal deficits. In addition, the high growth rates, the balance-of-payment 
equilibrium and GG revenues were, in most cases, dependent on the international 
prices of a few commodities, labor remittances and capital inflows.  
The vulnerabilities described above played a crucial role when the global fi-
nancial crisis hit the region in the second half of 2008. In the financial sphere, 
liquidity and credit dried up, capital started to fly back to the main financial cen-
ters, stock markets and commodity prices declined, risk premia for both sovereign 
and private borrowing grew dramatically, many national currencies depreciated 
threatening the massive insolvency of economic agents borrowing in foreign cur-
rencies and leading to a rapid increase in debt-to-GDP ratios (both public and pri-
vate). In the production sphere, external demand for exported goods (especially 
commodities) and labor declined. 
The overall macro-fiscal impact of the crisis can be summarized as follows. 
First, the recession caused a reduction of the tax base and, therefore, a reduction of 
GG revenues. Second, in individual countries, this impact worked through various 
specific channels. For instance, the fall in exports led to a much bigger decrease in 
taxes in countries that have special export taxes. On the other hand, tax revenues 
in countries with a bigger share of informal economy were less affected. The FSU 
countries preferred to keep their public expenditures at least at pre-crisis levels, 
which led to the deterioration of their fiscal balances. The deficits were financed 
mainly via external borrowing. The structure of GG expenditures changed mostly 
by increasing the proportion of spending on social protection. Health and educa-
tion expenditures (as a ratio to GDP) either remained almost unchanged (Belarus) 
or were increased slightly (other countries). 
In education, the FSU countries are confronted with an urgent need to intro-
duce new curricula, standards and delivery models. In the middle-income coun-
tries, like Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, a post-industrial stage of development 
requires a radical improvement in education quality to meet the needs of a 
knowledge-based economy. The lower-income FSU countries must adjust their 
educational systems to the priorities of their development strategies.  
Most of the FSU countries record above-average (as compared to countries at a 
similar level of per capita income) and growing enrolment in tertiary professional 
education. However, there are profound qualitative and quantitative mismatches 
between the structure of specialists trained and the needs of the labor market. Ter-
tiary education has become a symbol of social status rather than an instrument for 
obtaining knowledge and experience within a chosen specialty. Most countries 
must rehabilitate their VET systems and adapt their profiles according to the pre-
sent day needs of the economy. The crisis has further highlighted this need, since Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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the recession has reduced the capacity of enterprises to continue their training 
investments.  
The recession has not slowed down reforms in education; on the contrary, in 
some countries, reforms have accelerated in recent years. In most cases, the task of 
conducting reforms and structural changes was not articulated as an expenditure-
saving instrument. The future of public spending growth in the education sector is 
difficult to predict because of uncertainties regarding  the fiscal situations of each 
country in a post-crisis environment. This means that the mid-term education 
strategies in some countries will have to be reviewed and adjusted to actual fiscal 
constraints and to increased efficiency of public resources use.  
However, the infrastructure adjustment, which was a major source of saving in 
the sector, cannot be continued infinitely. Further efficiency gains can come from 
introducing PSF schemes, upgrading educational standards, introducing teachers’ 
performance appraisals, electing governing boards at public schools, etc. Expand-
ing independent quality control mechanisms on the basis of pre-existing independ-
ent test systems and creating a link between the results of this testing and the 
amounts of funding received by schools would serve to increase both efficiency 
and quality.  
The decentralization of the education management system down to the school 
level is a natural outcome of introducing PSF principles. It appeared to be a wide-
spread model of reform in post-communist countries (e.g. in Poland, Lithuania, 
Macedonia and Serbia) and is currently being implemented in Armenia and Geor-
gia, where, after 2003, school funding became independent from local authorities 
and is done through voucher schemes. It is believed that decentralization and in-
creased autonomy of education institutions (budgetary, program and institutional) 
can ensure competitiveness, improve education quality, and help establish closer 
interrelations with local labor markets.  
The shortage of public resources has led to a sizable increase of private re-
sources channeled to education. However, the deteriorating financial status of 
households limits their ability to further finance education services. In most of the 
countries, the absence of well-developed schemes of governmental education ben-
efits, such as direct, indirect and non-cash subsidies and loans for students, notice-
ably limits access to tertiary education among the poor.  
During the last twenty years, the  majority of the analyzed countries have re-
formed their health systems by reducing health establishment networks, making 
the transition to MHI and providing some limited guaranteed packages of health 
services instead of universal guaranteed access to public healthcare. These re-
forms, however, differed between countries, so the region now demonstrates a 
broad spectrum of models with various degrees of government involvement in the THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH… 
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financing and provision of health services. In all countries under consideration 
except Georgia, governments retain a leading role in financing healthcare systems. 
In the pre-crisis period, all governments substantially increased their financing 
of healthcare. Still, absolute levels of public health expenditures per capita in all of 
these countries remain well below the levels of not only rich “old” EU members, 
but also of the EU NMS. The crisis has not resulted in the reduction of absolute 
and/or relative public health expenditure indicators in all countries in the group 
(except for Georgia, where public health expenditures are of relatively low im-
portance and where their contraction in 2009 has been compensated by a consider-
able growth of private health expenditures).  
The comparison of health outcomes with health expenditures in the region re-
veals no strong correlation between the amount of resources spent on healthcare 
and the results achieved. This points to inefficient public health expenditures and 
the strong influence of factors unrelated to public health spending such as lifestyle 
or nutrition. 
In the medium-to-long-term, the countries under consideration will have to in-
crease their per capita health spending in order to catch up with modern healthcare 
technologies, cope with population ageing and, in some cases, replace external 
sources of financing with domestic ones. Some countries (especially Russia) do 
have the fiscal space to increase public health expenditures and should do so. At a 
minimum, all countries should protect the current levels of health spending and 
concentrate their efforts on making substantial improvements in efficiency. In 
particular, the promotion of healthy lifestyles and preventive policies can be im-
portant sources of efficiency gains. The increased and improved usage of public 
resources should be also accompanied by increasing reliance on private sources of 
health financing, especially in those countries which currently rely heavily on 
government budgets and where there is no fiscal space for a further expansion of 
public health spending.  
In order to implement or complete far-reaching reforms in both the education 
and healthcare sectors in the FSU region, the governments will need to adjust their 
spending patterns, which will require thorough planning, strong political will, and 
a transparent approach. 
 Alexander Chubrik, Marek Dabrowski, Roman Mogilevsky, Irina Sinitsina
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